
















Abstract: Using  nationally  representative, economy-wide data, this paper 
investigates the relative importance of trade-mandated effects on industry 
wage premia; industry and economy-wide skill premia; and employment 
flows in accounting for changes in the wage distribution in Brazil during 
the 1988-1995 trade liberalization. Unlike in other Latin American 
countries, trade liberalization appears to have made a significant 
contribution towards a reduction in wage inequality. These effects have 
not occurred through changes in industry-specific (wage or skill) premia. 
Instead, they appear to have been channeled through substantial 
employment flows across sectors and formality categories. Changes in the 
economy-wide skill premium are also important. 
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The hypothetical link between “globalization” and inequality (within developed 
countries; within developing countries; or between them) has been the subject of a vast 
literature over the last 20 years.  Even a cursory review of this literature reveals that 
“globalization” has been a “catch-all term that is used to describe phenomena as diverse 
as trade liberalization, outsourcing, increased immigration flows, removal of capital 
controls, cultural globalization and generally faster transmission of international shocks 
and trends” (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2004, p.1). In this paper, we will focus on evidence 
pertaining directly to trade liberalization although, in some cases, it is difficult to separate 
the impacts of trade liberalization strictly defined from those of outsourcing, or of 
increased flows of technical and managerial knowledge.  
 
Most of the literature on trade liberalization in Latin America has focused on Mexico, 
Chile and Colombia, and suggests that it has contributed to an increase in inequality (or 
at least in the gap between skilled and unskilled wages). Since there was a presumption 
that Latin America, like most other developing regions, was abundant in unskilled labor, 
this empirical finding appeared to contradict the predictions of the (two countries, two 
goods, two factors version of the) Stolper-Samuelson theorem in Hecksher-Ohlin trade 
theory. Although the next section briefly reviews some of this literature, this paper 
focuses on Brazil, a country where trade liberalization appears to have been inequality-
reducing.  
 
Previously one of the most heavily protected economies in the world, Brazil experienced 
an episode of marked trade liberalization between 1988 and 1995. Average nominal 
tariffs (weighted by lagged industry imports) fell from 43.4% in 1987 to 13.9% in 1995. 
Effective rates of protection fell from 55.8% to 20.0% in the same period. These large 
changes in protection had a correspondingly large impact on trade flows: 
import/consumption ratios across all manufacturing sectors rose from 15% in 1986 to 
31% in 1998. Figure 1 shows the evolution of both tariff rates and trade flows over the   3
1985-1999 period.
 3 It has also been argued that this episode of trade liberalization had a 
substantial impact on labor and total factor productivity growth, with the latter increasing 
by 6 percentage points in annual rate terms (Ferreira and Rossi, 2003). 
 
During this period Brazilian inequality, which had been rising until 1989, started a 
gradual but persistent decline. Figure 2 shows the long-term evolution of two commonly-
used inequality measures, the Gini and the Theil indices, between 1981-2004, for 
household income per capita. The bands around the point estimates denote the 95% 
bootstrapped confidence intervals. The Figure highlights the trade-liberalization period of 
1988-1995, during which inequality briefly rose (for one year) and then began to fall. The 
Theil index fell from 0.75 to 0.71 and the Gini fell by almost two points from 0.61 to 0.59 
over this seven-year interval. Both declines are statistically significant at the 1% level. As 
shown in Figure 3, inequality also fell in the distribution of hourly wages: the Gini fell by 
almost three points, from 0.61 to 0.58 and the Theil fell from 0.78 to 0.72. Both declines 
are significant at the 5% level. The economy-wide skill-premium (defined as the ratio of 
the wages of skilled workers to those of unskilled workers) fell by 14.3% (see Figure 4).
4 
Looking only at the skill premium in manufacturing, Gonzaga et al. (2006) find a similar 
(15.5%) decline between 1988 and 1995.  
 
Were these two phenomena linked? Did trade liberalization (and other aspects of 
increased openness which took place alongside it) cause at least part of the 
contemporaneous decline in Brazilian inequality? The literature is somewhat 
inconclusive. Focusing on the specific channels of industry wage premia (and industry-
specific skill premia) Pavcnik et al. (2004) find no evidence of any effect from trade 
liberalization on the Brazilian wage distribution. More recently, Gonzaga et al. (2006) 
argue persuasively that, through the more general channel of changes in the economy-
wide skill premium (as opposed to industry-specific premia), trade liberalization did 
                                                 
3 The data reported in Table 1 weigh tariff rates by lagged industry imports. An alternative weighting 
scheme (by industry value-added) generates an even more pronounced decline: citing data from Kume et al. 
(2000), Abreu (2004) reports a decline in nominal tariffs from 54.9% in 1987 to 10.8% in 1995. Effective 
rates of protection fell from 67.8% to 10.4% in the same period. 
4 We use an education-based definition of skill: skilled workers have 11 or more years of schooling; and 
unskilled workers are those with ten or fewer. We return to a discussion of this definition and alternatives 
below.   4
reduce wage disparities in Brazil. Although these two studies cover the same period, they 
use different data sets and methodologies, which lead them to focus on different aspects 
of the same phenomenon.  
 
Despite their differences, both studies focus on workers in manufacturing only. The 
manufacturing sector accounted for 16% (13%) of total employment in 1988 (1995) and 
there can be no a priori presumption that changes in the skill premium in that sector drive 
national wage inequality. During this same period, there has also been a convergence 
between urban and rural incomes in Brazil, which is often attributed to agricultural 
growth.
5 Although agriculture is eminently tradable, it has not to our knowledge been 
included in any analysis of liberalization and distribution in Brazil.  
  
This paper seeks to revisit the evidence on Brazil’s trade liberalization in a more 
comprehensive way. We innovate in four ways. First, we combine the approach used by 
Pavcnik et al. (2004) to study trade-mandated changes in industry-specific wage and skill 
premia, with a consideration of the economy-wide skill premium on which Gonzaga et al. 
(2006) focus, and ask what was the combined effect of the two channels on the wage 
distribution in Brazil. Second, unlike previous studies, our analysis covers workers in all 
sectors of the economy, including agriculture and services. Third, we explicitly consider 
employment responses to the tariff and exchange rate changes that took place over the 
period, investigating a channel of impact which is generally acknowledged as potentially 
important in theory, but seldom studied in practice. Fourth, we use our estimated models 
of wages and employment levels to simulate counterfactual wage distributions which 
allow us to decompose the changes in distribution actually observed over the seven years 
of trade liberalization into various components – some directly attributable to trade 
reforms, some which may or may not reflect trade changes, and some which are most 
likely independent of trade factors.  
 
Our main findings are, first, that trade liberalization in Brazil did in fact contribute to the 
observed reduction in wage inequality in the entire Brazilian economy – and not just in 
                                                 
5 See Ferreira, Leite and Litchfield (2006).   5
manufacturing. As argued by Gonzaga et al. (2006) - and unlike in Chile, Mexico and 
Colombia – Brazil’s pre-liberalization tariffs (adjusted by import penetration) were 
highest for skill-intensive goods. These tariffs fell by more than those for other goods, 
leading to a decline in their relative prices. Consistent with the simple Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem, this decline led to a decline in skilled wages, relative to those of unskilled 
workers, and to a movement of workers away from previously protected industries. As 
Pavcnik et al. (2004) found, other channels of impact through industry-specific wage and 
skill premia were unimportant. 
  
Second, the decomposition results suggest that: (i) changes in industry-specific wage 
premia and skill premia were unimportant. Although changes in tariffs have the expected 
sign, the overall effect on the wage distribution was negligible. (ii) The bulk of the trade 
impact on the wage distribution occurs through the employment and occupational 
reallocation that took place in response to changes in tariffs and relative prices. This 
effect accounts for a substantial fraction of the observed reduction in inequality between 
1988 and 1995. (iii) Changes in the economy-wide returns to skill – which may be at 
least partly driven by trade reforms – contributed to a further reduction in inequality (as 
did changes in other returns). (iv) Changes in the joint distribution of (observed and 
unobserved) worker characteristics were inequality-increasing, and partly offset some of 
the trade-driven changes in inequality. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a very brief overview of the 
literature, focusing on the conceptual channels through which trade reforms affect the 
distribution of incomes, and on five or six specific theoretical mechanisms through which 
openness has been hypothesized to affect wages and employment. Section 3 describes our 
data sets and the methodological approach. Section 4 presents the estimation results for a 
set of wage and employment regressions. Section 5 discusses a decomposition of the 
changes in Brazil’s wage distribution between 1988 and 1995, drawing on counterfactual 
distributions constructed on the basis of the models estimated in Section 4. It also 
discusses the implications of the wage decomposition for poverty and inequality more   6
broadly, measured in the distribution of household per capita incomes. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2.  A Brief Literature Review 
 
The literature on the relationship between “globalization” and distribution is now so 
extensive that Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) open their recent survey of the subject by 
noting that “the number of literature reviews alone is so large by now, that it seems that a 
review of literature reviews would be appropriate” (p.1). Given the existence of two 
excellent recent surveys – Winters, McCulloch and McKay (2004) and Goldberg and 
Pavcnik (2004) – we make no attempt at an exhaustive review here. Instead, this section 
briefly reviews two sub-themes which are of particular importance for our analysis in this 
paper: the channels through which trade reforms affect the distribution of income (and 
hence inequality and poverty); and the recent evidence on the distributional effects of 
trade reform in Latin America in general, and in Brazil in particular.
6  
 
2.1.  Channels of Impact from Trade Liberalization to Household Incomes 
 
If openness to the international economy brings persistent gains in terms of access to new 
knowledge and technology; or sustained gains in the growth rate of total factor 
productivity, then it is possible that trade liberalization leads to faster long-run economic 
growth. Whether or not this is in fact the case has been the subject of a debate, with Sachs 
and Warner (1995) and Edwards (1998) among the proponents, and Rodriguez and 
Rodrik (2001) leading the skeptics. The current balance of opinion seems to be that 
“despite the econometric and conceptual difficulties of establishing beyond doubt that 
openness enhances income levels, the weight of experience and evidence seems strongly 
in that direction” (Winters et al., 2004, p.78).  
 
                                                 
6 See also Nissanke and Thorbecke (2006) for a thoughtful discussion of the links between globalization 
and distribution.   7
If this is indeed the case, the effect of trade on growth, whether it is mediated through a 
faster rate of technology adoption or through greater dynamic efficiency gains from 
competitive pressures, is likely to be of first order importance in any understanding of the 
relationship between “globalization” and poverty, and policy makers should bear it very 
much in mind. Nevertheless, this paper belongs to the (large) strand of literature that 
seeks to understand the static or short-term impacts of trade liberalization on the 
distribution of incomes. When tariffs (or non-tariff barriers) are reduced or eliminated, 
the domestic prices of the relevant goods change. These price changes can affect 
household incomes (or consumption) through five main direct channels, namely: 
•  Output and input prices. If household members are self-employed, producing, 
trading and consuming different goods, then the first-order approximation to the 
change in their welfare as a result of changes in the price vector is simply 
() i
i
i i p c q W Δ − = Δ ∑ .
7 The basic insight is that net producers of those goods 
whose prices fall as a result of trade reforms lose out, while net consumers gain.  
•  Wages. For household members who are employed, the first effect of price 
changes is through the knock-on effect on factor prices, and crucially on the 
individual’s wage. The exact transmission mechanisms depend on the degree of 
competition in both factor and product markets, but the benchmark result under 
competitive markets is that as protection declines and relative goods prices move 
against the previously protected good, relative factor prices also move against the 
factor in which the protected good is intensive. This is the well-known Stolper-
Samuelson theorem in Hecksher-Öhlin trade theory.
8 
•  Employment. In response to changes in profitability that arise because of the 
aforementioned changes in product and factor prices, the composition of 
production typically changes after trade reforms. Industries whose product prices 
have fallen contract, and those whose relative product prices have risen expand. In 
                                                 
7 See Deaton (1997), and discussion in Winters et al. (2004). 
8 The theorem generates less clear-cut results in a world with more than two countries, goods or factors of 
production but, as we shall see, the basic insight from the 2x2x2 version of the theorem remains remarkably 
powerful.   8
response, there is a reallocation of employment across sectors and, in imperfect 
labor markets, changes in unemployment and/or the size of the informal sector. 
•  Consumption Prices. Self-employed workers are not the only people who 
consume. Employed workers, who are affected on the income side through 
changes in their wages and employment sector, are also affected by the changes in 
the relative prices of the goods they consume. Trade models often pay little heed 
to this channel because, if preferences are identical across individuals and 
homothetic, then changes in relative prices will affect all households equi-
proportionately. But if preferences are not, in fact, homothetic, or if they differ 
across households, then the shares of different goods in their consumption 
bundles will vary, and relative price changes will affect different households 
differently. Under this channel, we also include changes in the quality of 
consumption goods available to consumers, either directly because of differences 
in quality between imported and domestically-produced goods, or because of 
improvements in domestic production as a result of import competition, or of the 
availability of imported inputs. 
•  Taxes and Public Expenditures. As tariffs change so, in general, will tariff 
revenues. Although there is much evidence that it is possible to reduce protection 
in a revenue-neutral – or even revenue-enhancing – manner, if revenues do fall, 
then there will either be a decline in the level of some public service or transfer, 
or a rise in some other tax.
9 The incidence of these changes is entirely dependent 
on which expenditures or taxes are altered, and on their (marginal) incidence. 
 
Ultimately, all trade reforms must affect household welfare – and its distribution – 
through one of these five primary channels. Much of the discussion in the literature has 
focused, however, on the nature of the mechanism through which tariff changes affect 
wages and employment levels. A trade reform that lowers tariffs for a number of goods 
may affect relative wages and the composition of employment through the standard 
                                                 
9 The evidence suggests, however, that it has in many cases been possible to liberalize trade without loss in 
revenues. This may occur because non-tariff barriers generate rents for private agents, rather than 
government revenue; because some tariffs may initially be above their revenue-maximizing level; or 
because some trade reforms occur concomitantly with enhancements in the efficiency of customs agencies. 
See Ebrill et al. (1999) and the discussion in Winters et al. (2004).   9
Stolper-Samuelson channel, as described above, but it may also work in a number of 
different ways. These have been reviewed in some detail by Goldberg and Pavcnik 
(2004), and we provide only a sketch below: 
 
•  There may be changes in the wage premia to specific occupations (as opposed to 
industries), such as managers and highly skilled professionals. (See Cragg and 
Epelbaum, 1996). 
•  Trade liberalization may be accompanied by adjustments not only in the national 
composition of production, but in the international composition, with some 
activities being outsourced from developed to developing country locations. One 
hypothesis is that some of these activities are intensive in workers that are 
unskilled by rich-country criteria, but skilled in developing countries. See, for 
instance, Feenstra and Hanson (1996). 
•  Technical change that raises firms’ relative demand for skill is known as skill-
biased technical change (SBTC). Whereas in developed countries SBTC is 
typically seen as a competing explanation (vis-à-vis trade openness) for increases 
in skill premia, it has recently been argued that in developing countries, SBTC 
may be spurred on by trade liberalization. See Acemoglu (2003) and Theonig and 
Verdier (2003) for different models of how trade liberalization might lead to skill-
biased technical change in developing countries. If indeed trade liberalization 
leads to changes in the relative demand for skilled and unskilled workers because 
of induced changes in technology, then this is a separate effect, additional to 
Stolper-Samuelson. 
•  Related to the previous two channels is the possibility that greater openness 
changes the quality composition of domestic output. Most goods (shoes, textiles, 
cars or computers) can be produced with very different quality, and there is some 
evidence that greater participation in world trade shifts production towards 
higher-quality goods in (at least some) domestic firms. This may be in response to 
greater import competition, or because exchange rate changes shifts resources 
from non-exporters to exporters. If higher-quality varieties are more intensive in 
skilled workers, this effect too could raise the relative demand for skills in the   10
labor force. See Verhoogen (2006) and Shigeoka, Verhoogen and Wai-Poi (2006) 
for evidence from Mexico.  
•  Finally, wage levels for observably identical workers are not the same across 
different industries, either because of imperfect competition that gives rise to 
industry rents; or because of compensating differentials; or industry-specific 
skills. It is possible that tariff and mandated price changes affect these 
differentials, in addition to any impact they may have on the economy-wide skill 
premium. See e.g. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) on Colombia. 
 
2.2.  The Distributive Impact of Trade Liberalization in Latin America  
 
Contrary to what was found in earlier LDC liberalization episodes, notably in East Asia, 
Latin American trade liberalizations during the 1980s and 1990s have been 
predominantly contemporaneous with increases in the economy-wide wage skill 
premium, which is typically defined as the ratio of wages of skilled workers to the wages 
of unskilled workers.
10 Although this ratio is not a particularly good measure of wage 
inequality, and certainly a very poor indicator of inequality in household incomes, it has 
been the focus of most empirical work.
11  
 
Evidence of a rising skills gap has been comprehensively established for Mexico, by 
Feenstra and Hanson (1995), Cragg and Epelbaum (1996), Feliciano (2001), and Hanson 
and Harrison (1999), among others. It has also been documented for Chile by Beyer, 
Rojas and Vergara (1999); for Colombia by Attanasio, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004); and 
for Costa Rica by Robbins and Grindling (1999). Given the presumption that developing 
countries are abundant in unskilled labor, the first reaction to these results was that it 
seemed to contradict the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, and considerable effort has been 
expended in proposing alternative explanations, many of which were described in general 
terms in the preceding subsection.  
                                                 
10 It matters whether skill levels are measured in practice by education levels (as typically done in studies 
based on household survey data) or by production vs. non-production workers (as commonly done in 
studies using firm-level data.  
11 Later in this paper, we investigate how changes in skill premium map into changes in more general 
measures of inequality.   11
 
Adrian Wood (1997) argued that the simplest version of Stolper-Samuelson may not 
apply, because Latin American countries are perhaps abundant in land and natural 
resources, rather than unskilled labor; or because of the entry into the international 
trading system of countries even more unskilled-labor abundant, such as China and India. 
As discussed, Feenstra and Hanson (1995) suggested that part of the increase in the 
demand for skill in Mexico was due to outsourcing. Cragg and Epelbaum (1996) argued 
that it was driven by the increases in the returns to specific occupations, such as managers 
and administrators, who were highly skilled (rather than by returns to all skilled workers 
in the economy). Others have argued that greater openness has spurred a process of 
technological change that is skill-biased, as also discussed above. Attanasio, Goldberg 
and Pavcnik (2004) interpret their finding that increases in demand for skilled workers 
were largest for sectors with the largest tariff cuts as supporting the thesis of an 
endogenous skill-biased change in technology, that occurs in response to competitive 
pressures and to the availability of inputs brought about by greater openness. 
 
Each of these alternative stories – occupational rewards; skill-biased technical change; 
quality upgrading; outsourcing – is plausible, and each is supported by at least some of 
the available evidence. But it is also true that an examination of the patterns of protection  
in Chile, Colombia and Mexico prior to liberalization reveals that tariffs were generally 
higher for industries intensive in unskilled labor (than for skill-intensive industries). In 
this case, a fall in the relative prices of these goods, and thus in the price of the factor 




Brazil was an exception, in that effective protection prior to liberalization was higher for 
skill-intensive industries. The correlation between tariffs and industry skill-shares in 1988 
was mildly positive, and much stronger once tariffs are adjusted by the industry import 
penetration rates, which account for differences in the pass-through between tariffs and 
                                                 
12 See Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) for discussion.   12
prices in different sectors.
13 Gonzaga et al. (2006) show that, as tariffs were (partly) 
harmonized between 1988 and 1995, the tariff and effective rates of protection (ERPs) 
declines for skill-intensive industries were greater than for industries intensive in 
unskilled workers. In accordance with Stolper-Samuelson predictions, the relative prices 
of skill-intensive goods then fell, as did the relative wages of more skilled workers. Using 
mandated wage equations, these authors estimate that the decline in the manufacturing 
skill premium over this period was of the order of 25% - larger than the actually observed 
15% decline.  
 
In addition, the pattern of labor reallocation was more consistent with a Stolper-
Samuelson effect of trade liberalization, than with a Rybczynski-style effect of increases 
in the endowment of skilled labor: the manufacturing employment share of skilled 
workers rose by 2.67%, which decomposed into a 3.34% within-industries effect, and a 
negative 0.67% percent between industry effect. This contraction in the employment 
share of skill-intensive industries would not be expected if the dynamics were driven 
primarily by expansion in the endowment of skilled workers in Brazil, but is consistent 
with the expected employment reallocation in response to a trade shock. 
 
The evidence presented by Gonzaga et al. (2006) strongly suggests that the Brazilian 
trade liberalization of 1988-1995 played some role in the decline of inequality in Brazil 
which began during that period. It appears to have done so through the classic channel of 
changes in the economy-wide skill premium, in line with the prediction of Hecksher-
Ohlin trade theory, leading to a sizable decline in the wage gap between skilled and 
unskilled workers in manufacturing.
14  
 
But how important was this change in the skill premium for the actual size distribution of 
hourly wages in Brazil? There are two reasons why its importance is far from guaranteed: 
one is that skilled and unskilled workers are large and heterogeneous groupings. There is 
                                                 
13 See Gonzaga et al. (2006) on the importance of this correction. 
14 The literature suggests that alternative channels of impact were less important. Pavcnik et al. (2004), for 
instance, find no evidence that changes in industry-specific wage premia (or in skill-premia specific to 
certain industries) changed in response to trade liberalization. 
   13
considerable wage variation within each group, and the two group distributions do 
overlap. The second reason is that Gonzaga et al. (2006) consider only manufacturing 
workers, which accounted for 16% (13%) of total employment in 1988 (1995). Changes 
in their relative position vis-à-vis workers in agriculture (which were also affected by 
changes in tariffs) and in services (which were indirectly affected by changes in tariffs, 
and also by changes in the exchange rate) may have led to overall changes in wage 
inequality which are quite different from those mandated by the Stolper-Samuelson 
effects within manufacturing. 
 
In the remainder of this paper we examine two basic questions. First, we seek to place the 
changes in wage inequality which can be attributed to trade policy changes in the context 
of other changes that were concurrently affecting the wage distribution. Second, and 
more specifically, we also seek to quantify the contribution of the trade-mandated 
employment reallocation effects to changes in the wage distribution. A third, albeit more 
tentative, contribution is to investigate the implications of these trade-driven changes in 
the wage distribution for poverty and inequality in the distribution of household incomes 
per capita. 
 
3.  Data and Methodology. 
 
3.1   The Data Sets. 
The data used in this study come from two different sources. The first of these is the 
household survey data, which are used to obtain information on wages, hours of work, 
occupations, education levels, age, gender, race and location of workers. We use 11 
waves of the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD), fielded by the 
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), annually between 1987 and 
1999.
15 The PNAD is a nationally representative household survey, with a stratified and 
clustered sampling design which ensures coverage of rural and urban areas in every state 
of the federation, except for the rural areas of Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Pará, Rondônia 
                                                 
15 There are eleven waves because the survey was not carried out in 1991 or 1994.    14
and Roraima.
16 Sample sizes varied somewhat from year to year, around approximately 
300,000 individuals per year.  
 
For our wage analysis, we considered all workers aged 15-65 who reported positive 
earnings during the survey’s reference week. Since we are interested in quantifying the 
importance of trade and openness-related changes in explaining overall changes in the 
wage distribution, we include all workers, in agriculture, industry and services, regardless 
of formality or own-account status. Effective sample sizes for this analysis were 107,195 
workers in 1998 and 123,455 workers in 1995. This is an important difference between 
our analysis and those of Gonzaga et al. (2006), or Pavcnik et al. (2004), who focus 
exclusively on workers in manufacturing.
17 The wage definition is hourly wages, 
calculated as a quarter of the monthly wage, divided by the number of hours worked on 
the average week. All monetary values are inflated to September 2004 prices, using the 
INPC deflator with the Corseuil and Fogel (2002) adjustment to the 1994 index. See 
Ferreira, Leite and Litchfield (2006) for the full deflator in each PNAD reference month. 
 
As all PNAD-based studies, we use years of schooling as our measure of a worker’s 
skill.
18 In earnings regressions, we group workers into nine schooling groups: zero years; 
1-3 years; 4 years; 5-7 years; 8 years (completed primary); 9-10 years (some high 
school); 11 years (completed high school); 12-14 years (some university); 15+ years 
(completed university). We also use this variable to construct a dichotomous skill 
indicator, classifying workers with 0-10 years of schooling as unskilled, and those with 
11 or more (completed high school and above) as skilled. Earnings regressions were also 
estimated with an alternative indicator, which classified only workers with 15 years of 
                                                 
16 These rural areas broadly correspond to the Amazon rainforest, which was excluded from PNAD 
sampling until 2003. Census data suggests that these areas account for 2.3% of the Brazilian population. 
17 The sample in Pavcnik et al. (2004) is, in addition, based on the Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (PME) and 
is thus only representative of the country’s six main metropolitan areas. 
18 Use of education to define a worker’s skill is in fact common to most household or labor-force survey-
based studies. Articles relying on firm-level data typically classify production workers as unskilled, and 
non-production workers as skilled. Although Slaughter (2000) shows that the two definitions do not seem 
to lead to very different conclusions in the US, Gonzaga et al. (2006) show that the distinction does matter 
for Brazil. Like the latter authors, we feel that the education classification is more appropriate in the 
Brazilian case, since trade liberalization and outsourcing of support activities led to considerable changes in 
the employment levels of non-productions workers during the period.    15
schooling or more as skilled, and all results were qualitatively robust. Since workers with 
completed university accounted for 4.5% of the labor force in 1988; while workers with 
complete high school and above represented 16.4%, we chose the latter classification as 
more meaningful for Brazil. See Gonzaga et al. (2006) for a similar discussion of this 
classification. 
 
The second data set used for this study comprises the trade-related variables for 22 
industries, across the 1987-1999 period. Six trade-related variables are used: nominal 
tariffs and effective rates of protection come from Kume et al. (2000), as reported in 
Abreu (2004); import penetration and export shares by industry come from Muendler 
(2003); and import-weighted and export-weighted industry-specific exchange rates were 
constructed by the authors, based on the methodology suggested by Goldberg (2004), and 
using data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the UN’s 
COMTRADE.
19 Table 1 presents initial (1988) and terminal (1995) values for each of 
these variables for the 22 industries into which we have grouped Brazilian firms.
20  As in 
Pavcnik et al. (2004), our use of household survey and trade data with different industry 
definitions necessitated a concordance between the various datasets, mapping the more 
disaggregated industry classifications in the trade data to the broader PNAD 
classifications. In addition to the standard Nível 80 to Nível 100 concordance,
21 we 
developed concordances of our own.  The main one is based on (but not identical to) 
Pavcnik et al. (2004), and is presented in Table 2.
22 A more detailed description of the 
steps taken to clean, construct and match the data is included in the data appendix. 
 
                                                 
19 As Goldberg (2004) notes, “At the national level, analyses of exchange rate moves often rely on 
aggregate trade-weighted exchange rates. However, aggregate indexes can be less effective than industry-
specific indexes in capturing changes in industry competitive conditions induced by moves in specific 
bilateral exchange rates.” (p.1) 
20 Although we use data until 1999 in our estimation stage, the key initial and terminal years for our wage 
decomposition analysis are 1988 (at the onset of trade liberalization) and 1995 (the year in which it was 
completed. 
21 Available on Marc Muendler’s excellent website of Brazilian data resources 
(http://www.econ.ucsd.edu/muendler/html/brazil.html). Nível 80 and 100 are official Brazilian industry 
classifications. 
22 We are grateful to Nina Pavcnik and Norbert Schady for graciously making the details of their 
concordance available to us.  A further concordance between Nível 100 and the trade categories used by 
Kume et al (2000) was also constructed, but is too detailed to present here.   16
3.2. Methodology. 
Since the objective is to understand and quantify the role of trade-induced changes in the 
wage distribution, in relation to the overall observed changes, we combine an extended 
version of the two-stage estimation framework which has recently been used to 
investigate the effect of trade reforms on wage premia in a number of settings, with a 
more general decomposition of changes in the entire wage distribution. Following 
Pavcnik et al. (2004), our first stage regresses log hourly wages (wij) on a vector of 
worker i’s characteristics (including sex, race, experience, education, residential region, 
urban/rural status, household headship status, and formality status); a vector of industry j 
indicators (Iij); and a set of interactions between industry indicators and skill category:
23 
 
ij j ij ij j ij ij ij sp S I wp I X w ε β + + + = ) * ( * ln                    (1) 
 
Equation 1 is estimated separately for each year in the data set, from 1987 to 1999. In 
addition to the wage equation, our first stage also includes a model of employment for 
each year in the sample, where an individual’s occupation is regressed on a similar set 
(Zij) of personal characteristics, as well as whether or not he or she has children, and the 
spouse’s occupational status. Given the polychotomous nature of the occupational choice, 
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In equation (2), there are ten possible occupational choices (j), corresponding to 
inactivity; unemployment; self-employment; employer status; and formal or informal 
employment in each of three broad sectors: agriculture, manufacturing and services. The 
full specification of models (1) and (2) is presented in the next section, alongside with 
results. 
                                                 
23 Recall, skilled workers are defined here as having completed high school or better (11+ years of 
education).   17
 
In the second stage, three sets of estimated coefficients from the first stage are pooled 
over time and regressed on a set of trade-related industry characteristics. The dependent 
variables in this stage are: (i) the industry premia coefficients from (1), wpjt; (ii) the 
industry-specific skill premia coefficients from (1), spjt; and (iii) the constant terms λ0jt 
for each occupation from (2). Each of these variables vjt ={wpjt; spjt; λ0jt) is regressed (in 
first differences) on a set of trade-related variables (Tjt), including industry- specific 
effective rates of protection, import- and export-weighted exchange rates; import 
penetration and export shares: 
 
jt jt jt T v η γ + Δ = Δ                           ( 3 )  
 
In addition to estimating a two-stage employment model, which we have not seen in the 
trade literature, there are other differences between these estimations and those reported 
in Pavcnik et al. (2004). Our data comes from a nationally representative household 
survey (the PNAD), and include workers in agriculture and non-tradable industries (for 
which industry-specific exchange rates can be constructed,
24 and affect relative prices). 
Rather than relying on the manufacturing sector in the six largest metropolitan areas of 
Brazil, our sample is therefore much more broadly representative of the country. Possibly 
as a result, some of our estimation results are different than those in Pavcnik et al. (2004), 
and we discuss them briefly in the next section. 
 
But the main purpose of estimating equations (1)-(3) is to use them in the decomposition 
of all changes in the full wage distribution between 1988 and 1995. Following Juhn, 
Murphy and Pierce (1993) – henceforth cited as JMP – one can decompose the difference 
between the wage distribution prior to the liberalization (say, in 1988) and the wage 
distribution afterwards (say, in 1995) into three components: one due to changes in 
observed worker characteristics (X); one due to changes in the returns to those 
characteristics (measured by regression coefficients β) and a final one due to changes in 
                                                 
24 We use economy-wide import- and export-weighted exchange rates for the non-tradables sector.   18
the distribution of residuals (ε). Writing the distribution function of the residuals of 
equation (1) as  ) ( it t it F ε θ = , a standard JMP decomposition would proceed as follows.
25 
 
After estimating earnings regressions (like (1)) in both initial and terminal years: 
() 88
1
88 88 88 88 ln i i i F X w θ β
− + =   and 
() 95
1
95 95 95 95 ln i i i F X w θ β
− + = , 
one would simulate two counterfactual wage distributions, as follows: 
() 88
1
88 95 88 ln i i
a
i F X w θ β
− + =                        ( 4 )  
() 88
1
95 95 88 ln i i
b
i F X w θ β
− + =                        ( 5 )  
 
The difference between wage distributions  ( ) 88 w G  and  ( )
a w G  would be interpreted as 
being due to differences in returns between the 1988 and 1995. The difference between 
( )
a w G  and  ( )
b w G  would be due to changes in the distribution of (or returns to) 
unobservable worker characteristics. Finally, the difference between  ( ) 95 w G  and  ( )
b w G  
would be due to changes in the joint distribution of observed worker characteristics (and 
their joint correlation with the residuals).
26 
 
Using our estimates of equations (1) – (3), we construct an expanded set of such 
counterfactual wage distributions, which also form an exact decomposition of the 
observed change between 1988 and 1995.
27 We construct six counterfactual wage 
distributions, chosen to shed light on different channels of effect from the trade-
liberalization. Not all of the channels discussed in Section 2 are covered, but the key 
wage and employment channels are addressed.  
                                                 
25 We say  “a standard JMP decomposition” because there are variations on the basic theme. Alternative 
orderings could be used, or average coefficients instead of final year coefficients, etc. The specific 
interpretation varies, but the essence of the insight is the same. 
26 As noted by JMP, and in the closely related work of DiNardo et al. (1996) and Bourguignon Ferreira and 
Lustig (2004), this is an accounting decomposition. Changes in the return structure are clearly causally 
related to changes in the distribution of characteristics (in more than one way). The decomposition exercise 
does not disentangle these causal relations, but provides a description of the observed changes. 
27 As in the original JMP decomposition, and indeed in any generalized Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, the 
order of the simulations matter: the decomposition is path dependent. See Lemieux (2002) and 
Bourguignon et al. (2004) for discussions.   19
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where  ( ) wp j j
s
j T T wp γˆ
88 95 − =  and  wp γˆ  are the estimated coefficients in the second-stage 
regression (3) for the industry wage premia. This first simulation therefore corresponds to 
changes in the wage distribution due only to those changes in industry wage premia 
which are mandated by changes in the exogenous trade variables included in the second-
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88 95 − =   and  sp γˆ  are the estimated coefficients in the second-stage 
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where 
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0 λ γ λ j j
s
j T T − =  into the occupational multinomial logit in equation (2), and then 
using it to predict the corresponding counterfactual distribution of occupations.
28 This 
third simulation therefore corresponds to the overall effect of industry premia, industry-
specific skill premia and employment changes mandated by the second-stage trade 
variables, under the maintained functional form assumptions in (3). 
 
The power of the preceding counterfactuals to simulate the changes in the wage 
distribution that arise from trade reforms depends entirely on the ability of the linear 
second stage equations to identify the impact of changes in tariffs and exchange rates on 
wage premia and employment probabilities. They also miss, so far, a key theoretical 
channel through which a trade liberalization is likely to impact on wage differences in the 
                                                 
28 As noted above, the ten occupational categories specified in equation 2 were more aggregated than the 22 
industries for which wage and skill premia are estimated. In constructing G(w
3), workers whose predicted 
occupations differed from those observed in 1988 due to changes in λ0j were allocated to specific industries 
(within the broad sector to which they were mapped by the multinomial logit) by random draws with 
probabilities derived from the 1995 employment distribution across industries.   20
economy, namely changes the economy-wide skill premium. After all, the wpj and spj 
coefficients capture only changes in industry specific remuneration rates, controlling for 











ij ij F sp S I wp I X w θ β
− + + + =              (9) 
where  { }
88 95; ed ed
s
− = β β β . The difference between (9) and (8) is twofold: the industry and 
industry-specific skill premium coefficients mandated by the second stage are replaced 
with those estimated in 1995; and the economy-wide returns on schooling coefficient is 
replaced with its 1995 value. This simulation therefore corresponds to a “more generous” 
estimate of the “price effects” of trade liberalization, in which the full changes in returns 
to education and to industry membership – rather than only those mandated by the second 
stage – are included. Although the main channel through which trade reforms might 
affect 
95
ed β  is the Stolper-Samuelson effect of reduced protection in skill-intensive 
industries, there may be other channels too. If one is prepared to accept that skill-biased 
technical change in Brazil, or skill-demanding changes in the quality composition of 
domestic output, are endogenous to trade liberalization, as discussed in Section 2, then 
one may come closer to the view that all changes in the returns to schooling between 
1988 and 1995 are, in some way or another, related to trade. Be that as it may, we see this 
particular counterfactual wage distribution as a generous estimate of the joint wage and 
employment effects of trade on the wage distribution. The true contribution of trade 
liberalization to changes in Brazilian inequality is likely to lie somewhere between the 
changes accumulated up to equation (8) and those corresponding to (9).  
 
Three remaining steps (and two counterfactual distributions) complete the decomposition 
– and represent changes that are less likely to have been driven by trade reforms. The first 
of these (in equation 10) computes the additional changes in the structure of returns to 
observed characteristics (like experience, location, race, gender, etc.). The second (in 
equation 11), brings in the distribution of residuals from 1995, in a rank-preserving 
transformation: 
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corresponds to differences in the joint distribution of observed characteristics between 
1995 and 1988 (except for the changes in occupational structure due to trade, which had 
been predicted in equation 8). This step also accounts for changes in the correlation 
between the observed characteristics and the residual terms, including any changes in 
selection into the labor force. 
 
Only equation (1), for 1988, and equation (12), for 1995 are estimated on observed data. 
Equations (6)-(11) give rise to simulated wage distributions  ( )
1 w G  to  ( )
6 w G . In Section 
5, simulation results are presented in two ways. First, a number of inequality indicators 
are computed for each counterfactual distribution, so that we can decompose the 
observed changes between 1988 and 1995 into the components corresponding to each 
counterfactual. Second, we can see a fully disaggregated picture by plotting the observed 
wage growth incidence curve between 1988 and 1995,  ( )
88 88 95
p p p w w w p g − = , and 






s w w w p g − = , s = 1, …,6.
29 
 
4. Estimation  Results 
 
Before we turn to the simulation results in the next section, this section presents the 
estimation results on which they build. Table 3a presents the main first-stage results for 
the wage equation (1), while Tables 3b and 3c report the industry-specific wage and skill 
                                                 
29 The “wage growth incidence curve” is an application to the distribution of wages of Ravallion and 
Chen’s (2003) concept of growth incidence curve, which those authors originally defined on the 
distribution of household incomes or expenditures.   22
premia coefficient estimates respectively. Each model was estimated for each year in the 
1987-1999 interval for which data were available. The results in Table 3a are in line with 
existing analysis of the Brazilian labor market (see e.g. Ferreira and Barros, 1999). There 
are large and significant returns to education, and smaller and concave returns to 
experience. Measured with respect to zero years of schooling, returns to education fell 
consistently over the period. This decline was most pronounced for intermediate 
education categories (4-10 years of schooling). Returns to experience have also fallen. 
There is a substantial male wage premium, which has also been declining. In contrast, 
racial premia of both whites and Asians with respect to Afro-Brazilians have persisted or 
increased. Controlling for other observed characteristics, employers, the self-employed 
and formal employees all earn more than informally employed workers. Metropolitan and 
urban location premia vis-à-vis rural workers of identical characteristics have also fallen 
over the period, though they remain statistically significant. All specifications also 
include industry and interacted industry-skill indicators, the coefficients on which are 
reported in Tables 3b and 3c. These coefficients are then pooled and regressed on a 
vector of trade variables in the second stage.  
 
Table 4a reports the first-stage results for the employment model in (2), as marginal 
effects of unit changes in each independent variable, with all other variables held at their 
mean values. These estimates are also mostly in line with expectations. Workers with 
more experience and education are less likely to be employed in agriculture or 
informally. In addition, those with higher education are also more likely to be employers, 
as are whites and Asians, and to work in the formal non-tradables sector, presumably 
often as professionals.  We also see some evidence over time of more females entering 
the labor force.  While men are more likely to be working, the male coefficient falls 
between 1988 and 1995 across most industries.  The industry constants, which are pooled 
and used in the second stage, are summarized in Table 4b. 
 
One concern that is typically voiced with respect to multinomial logit models such as (2) 
is that they assume that the odds ratios of any two possibilities (pj/pk) are independent of 
the number and nature of alternative outcomes. This is known as the independence of   23
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) hypothesis. When alternative polychotomous discrete choice 
models that do not make this assumption, such as multinomial probits, are unstable or 
display convergence problems, one can test for the validity of the assumption using, for 
instance, the Hausman specification test which, in essence, tests for the stability of 
parameter estimates as alternative outcomes are excluded from the model. This test failed 
to reject the null hypothesis (that IIA is satisfied) for 8 out of our 9 outcome categories 
for 1995. Although results were poorer for 1988, with four rejections of the null, the 




Table 5 reports the second-stage regression of industry wage premia on effective rates of 
protection, import penetration, export shares, and import- and export-weighted real 
exchange rates. All specifications are in first-differences. Import penetration rates and 
export shares are entered only in lags, so as to reduce possible simultaneity concerns. The 
basic argument for treating changes in effective rates of protection – the main variable of 
interest – as exogenous is the same as in Attanasio, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) and 
Pavcnik et al. (2004): trade reforms in Latin America in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
arose as a response to becoming GATT / WTO members, or to a central policy decision 
to comply with previously negotiated rules. “This reflects the government’s objective to 
reduce tariffs across industries to more uniform rates negotiated with the WTO. 
Policymakers accordingly cater less to special lobby interests, so that tariff declines in 
each industry are proportional to the industry’s pre-reform tariff levels (…) alleviating 
concerns about endogeneity at least in the economic sense” (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2004, 
p.4.) 
 
Eight different specifications are presented in Table 5. While ERPs are insignificant 
when differences are entered contemporaneously, they become robustly statistically 
significant in first lags (specifications 4 – 8). The coefficients on lagged ERPs have the 
expected positive sign and are statistically significant at the usual levels, suggesting that 
larger declines in protection were associated with larger declines in the industry wage 
                                                 
30 Details from the Hausman specification test are available from the authors on request.   24
premium over this period in Brazil.
31 Nevertheless, the estimated size of the impact is 
small: using the ERP coefficient from specification 8, the fall in average ERP from 
51.4% in 1988 to 20.0% in 1995 (with all other variables held at their mean values) 
would result in a 1.6% decrease in average industry wage premium.  
 
Although theory suggests that the pass-through of tariffs to product prices, and thus to 
wages, is mediated by the sector’s import penetration (see Gonzaga et al., 2006), import-
penetration does not appear to be important in mediating the effect of tariffs on industry-
specific wage premia, as shown by the insignificant coefficients on the interaction terms. 
The same is not true of (import-weighted) exchange rate effects, which have the predicted 
(negative) sign
32 when interacted with lagged import penetration: as the currency 
appreciates and imports become more competitive for a particular industry, wage premia 
in that industry decline. When the RER is export-weighted and interacted with lagged 
export-share, the effect is positive and significant.
33 
 
Table 6 presents the second-stage results for the regression of industry-specific skill 
premia on the same set of trade-related variables. For industry-specific skill premia, once 
the economy-wide returns to skill are controlled for in the first stage, there are no 
particular theoretical predictions, and we find that the coefficients on ERPs are 
insignificant across all specifications. Interestingly, however, we find a fairly robust 
pattern of negative and significant coefficients on lagged import penetration, suggesting 
that skill premia were falling for those industries where the growth in import penetration 
was largest. We know that these were largely skill-intensive industries that were most 
highly protected prior to 1988, as seen in Table 1. This movement in industry-specific 
skill premia is therefore consistent with the decline in the economy-wide skill premium 
                                                 
31 Although Pavcnik et al. (2004) expected these results (“The models predict a  positive association 
between industry tariffs and wages, so that declines in industry tariffs lead to proportional declines in 
industry wages”, p.321), they did not find them. This may have been due to their use of the less 
representative PME data, or to specifications that did not include lagged ERPs. Lagging ERPs accounts for 
the fact that the effects of reduced protection on industry premia may take time to flow through.  Our 
protection results are, however, consistent with those for Colombia (Attanasio, Goldberg and Pavcnik, 
2004), and Mexico (Revenga, 1997). 
32 An increase in our exchange rates means an appreciation in the currency. 
33 This likely reflects the fact that an increase in an industry’s export share would be expected to increase 
that industry’s wage premium.   25
which was documented in Gonzaga et al. (2006), and which we also observe. Controlling 
for the growth in import penetration, there appears to be some evidence that a stronger 
currency increases the skill premium.
34 
 
Table 7 reports the second-stage results for the regression of industry participation 
constants from the employment multinomial logit model on the same set of trade-related 
variables. These results are somewhat harder to interpret, since the ten occupational 
categories used in the estimation are much more aggregated than the 22 industries used in 
the previous two tables, and are basically at the agriculture, manufacturing and services 
level.
35 Partly as a result, there is a counterintuitive negative sign on lagged ERPs, which 
suggests a (conditional) movement towards the industries experiencing the greater 
declines in protection. This result is explained by a movement towards the tradable 
sectors (particularly agriculture) of the reference category of workers in the employment 
model. Once we look at the unconditional pattern of employment changes for all workers 
at the disaggregated industry level, in Figure 5, we observe the expected positive 
correlation: employment levels seem to have fallen by more in industries experiencing 
larger declines in protection. 
 
The only other statistically significant result in Table 7 is easier to interpret: lagged 
export shares are positively correlated with conditional increases in employment, 
suggesting that industries that succeeded in increasing their exports suffered smaller 
declines in employment than others.  
 
Taken together, these results paint a mixed picture. The signs and significance are 
broadly – if not wholly – consistent with theoretical expectations from models that 
feature barriers to labor movement across sectors. Larger falls in protection and an 
exchange rate that makes imports more competitive domestically imply lower industry 
                                                 
34 This may be evidence of quality upgrading in the face of increased import competition. 
35 Both formal and informal agriculture categories are regressed on trade variables for the agricultural 
industry. Formal and informal manufacturing use manufacturing trade variables averaged over the various 
manufacturing industries, using lagged imports as weights.  Formal and informal nontradables, employers 
and the self-employed categories are assigned zero ERPs, import penetration and export share, but use 
economy-wide import- and export-weighted real exchange rates.   26
wage premia. More exports in an industry are associated with increased wage premia and 
employment. Greater import penetration is associated with falls in wage premia which 
are greater for more skilled workers (who work mostly in industries that suffered the 
largest increase in penetration). These results are perhaps more in line with theory and 
with other accounts of trade liberalization in Brazil than previous attempts at estimating 
these relationships in Brazil, notably by Pavcnik et al. (2004).  
 
Yet, they leave much to be desired. Empirically, the R
2 of each second stage regression  
is never higher than 0.12. For the wage equations, they are never higher than 0.04, 
suggesting that, however economically important the joint variation in the trade variables 
may be, it accounts for a small share of the observed variation in wage premia across 
industries and over time. Conceptually, these wage regressions focus on only one of the 
five mechanisms through which trade reforms are thought to influence changes in wages 
in developing countries (which were reviewed in Section 2), namely changes in industry 
specific wage and skill premia.  
 
However, if workers can move across industries over the medium-run, and if market 
imperfections in labor and product markets are not particularly severe, then it is likely 
that the main effects of the changes in protection observed in Brazil over this period 
manifest themselves through (i) worker reallocation across industries and (ii) changes in 
the economy-wide skill premium. This prediction would accord with the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, but might also be consistent with economy-wide trade-induced 
SBTC or quality ladder models. In the next section, we turn to the full decomposition of 
wage changes in Brazil between 1988-1995, in an effort to place the changes implied by 
the second stage regressions reported in Tables 5-7 into context – both vis-à-vis other 
changes that may be associated with trade channels, and vis-à-vis other economic 
processes that are less likely to be driven by trade reforms.  
 
5. Decomposition  Results 
 
5.1  The Distribution of Hourly Wages   27
Table 8 summarizes the results of the decomposition described in Section 3.2. It presents 
four measures of inequality for the 1988 and 1995 hourly wage distributions in Brazil, as 
well as for the six intermediate counterfactual distributions previously described. The 
measures are the 90
th/10
th percentile ratio; the mean log deviation (also known as GE(0), 
or Theil-L index); the Theil-T index (or GE-1) and the Gini coefficient. Figures 6-11 plot 
the observed wage growth incidence curve (WGIC) between 1988 and 1995, as well as 
different counterfactual WGICs, each corresponding to one of the counterfactual 
distributions listed on Table 8. The figures provide a full-distribution, disaggregated 
decomposition of wage changes. 
 
The differences between G(w
1) and G(w
88), which correspond to the impact of the trade-
mandated changes in industry-wage premia, are economically insignificant: 
counterfactual inequality measures hardly move, and the counterfactual WGIC in Figure 
6 remains very close to the x-axis. Despite statistically significant coefficients on the 
tariffs in the second-stage estimation described in the previous section, it appears that 
changes in the wage distribution due to industry wage premia between 1988 and 1995 
were immaterial. The same is true of changes in industry-specific skill-premia, which are 
incorporated into G(w
2), in Figure 7. Thus, although our second-stage regression 
coefficients are statistically significant (while theirs are not), we reach the same essential 
conclusion on the economics of these impacts as Pavcnik et al. (2004): trade 
liberalization did not affect the Brazilian wage distribution through industry specific 
premia. 
 
But when relative prices and wages change, firms and industries contract and expand in 
response. Workers flow across sectors and industries, and their movement is highly 
selective (on observed and unobserved characteristics). The difference between G(w
2) 
and G(w
3) is meant to capture those occupational (employment) changes which took 
place in response to changes in trade-related variables (as predicted by the second-stage 
regressions). These counterfactual changes are much larger than those associated with 
industry-specific wage and skill-premia. All four inequality measures for G(w
3) move 
closer to their 1995 values: the difference in inequality between this simulation and 1988   28
ranges between 51% of the 1995-1988 difference (for p90/p10) and 76% (for the Theil –
T). Figure 8 reveals that the bulk of the underestimate is due to the bottom of the 
distribution: whereas G(w
3) generates a remarkably good prediction of changes in the 
wage distribution from the 20
th percentile upwards, it considerably underestimates gains 
for the bottom quintile. 
 
Allowing for changes in the economy-wide returns to education (and thus in a flexible 
version of the economy-wide skill premium) contributes to a further reduction in 
inequality, which now in fact overshoots the 1995 targets (for three of the four 
measures).
36 Consistent with the decline in returns to higher levels of schooling, this 
simulation does not affect the bottom of the distribution much, but lowers counterfactual 
incomes in the middle and at the top (Figure 9).  
 
It is harder to attribute these changes to trade reforms, since this counterfactual imports 
observed 1995 coefficients (on education, as well as on industry dummies and industry 
skill premia), rather than those mandated by the second-stage. The bulk of the difference 
between G(w
3) and G(w
4) is due to 
95
ed β  which, by its very nature as an economy-wide 
vector of returns, does not vary by industry and can not be estimated in a second stage. 
But the fact that it can not be included in a Pavcnik et al.-style second stage does not 
mean that it does not reflect trade changes. In fact, as discussed above, if output and labor 
markets are reasonably well-functioning, a number of theories of trade would predict an 
important effect of trade liberalization on this coefficient. The Stolper-Samuelson effect 
would predict a decline in the economy-wide skill premium, and thus an inequality-
reduction from importing 
95
ed β . Trade-induced SBTC, as well as most versions of the 
outsourcing or quality ladder stories would imply an increase in the demand for skilled 
workers, and thus an increase in inequality from 
95
ed β .  
 
                                                 
36 This result is reminiscent of the Gonzaga et al. (2006) finding that trade-mandated changes in the 
(economy-wide) skill premium were larger than those actually observed.   29
On the other hand, changes in 
95
ed β  clearly also reflect other economic and demographic 
changes, notably changes in the supply of skilled workers. As shown in Figure 4, there 
was indeed some growth in the skills of the Brazilian labor force over this period, with 
the share of skilled workers rising from 20% to 24%. All in all, this decomposition 
method does not allow us to separate these changes in inequality into components due to 
each of the alternative trade hypotheses, and a component due to changes in the supply of 
skills (or to technology changes unrelated to trade). All that can be said is that the net 
effect suggests that the Stolper-Samuelson channel and the effects of increased skill 
supply (which go in the same direction) seem to have outweighed any effects of SBTC or 
quality compositional changes that might have occurred as a result of trade liberalization.  
 
The two final steps in the decomposition incorporate changes in the remainder of the 
earnings regression coefficients (the other elements of β) to generate G(w
5); and a rank-
preserving transformation in the distribution of residuals to generate G(w
6). Finally, the 
differences between G(w
6) and G(w
95) are residually due to changes in the joint 
distribution of observed characteristics (and in their correlation with the unobserved, 
including selection). Although effects of trade on the returns to experience, or to 
unobserved skills, can not be ruled out, these are not channels on which the literature has 
focused. Accordingly, we interpret these remaining changes as those which are not 
attributable to trade effects. Changes in non-education returns are mildly equalizing, and 
poverty-reducing. Changes in the distribution of residuals contribute to lower incomes in 
the middle of the distribution and higher incomes at the very top. The net effect is mildly 
inequality increasing (except for p90/p10). The effect of changes in the distribution of 
observed characteristics further lowers incomes in the middle of the distribution and 
raises them above the 75
th percentile.  
 
5.2.  The Distribution of Household Income per Capita 
Once the six counterfactual wage distributions G(w
1) to G(w
6) have been simulated, it is a 
simple matter to create the corresponding counterfactual distributions of household 
income per capita. Household identifiers link each worker in our data set to a particular 
household, and information is available on all of its other sources of income (subject to   30
the usual misreporting and measurement issues in an income survey like the PNAD). It is 
therefore possible to simulate the impact of these counterfactual changes in wages on the 
distribution of household incomes, and on the inequality and poverty levels associated 
with it. These results are reported on Table 9, and in Figures 12-17, for the same 
inequality indices used so far and for the three standard FGT poverty measures. We adopt 
a relative poverty line of R$87.55 in 2004 prices, which corresponds to 50% of the 1988 
median household per capita income.  
 
Before discussing these results, it is important to recognize that their limitations are even 
greater than those for the wage distribution decompositions analyzed so far. In addition to 
the same caveat about path dependence, now the absence of general equilibrium effects 
extends to any indirect impacts of trade (or any other changes) on family composition, or 
on the occupational decisions of household members other than spouses. There are also 
important changes in other, unrelated policy parameters, such as the real value of pension 
payments and other transfers, which are consigned to the residual – which is therefore 
larger than in the decomposition described in Table 8. 
 
As in the hourly wage distribution, trade-mandated changes in industry wage premia and 
industry-specific skill premia have very limited effects (although they are somewhat 
more inequality increasing, suggesting that the workers hardest-hit by wage declines in 
contracting industries belonged to poorer households: Figures 12 and 13). The biggest 
impact, as before, comes in the transition from the second to the third counterfactual 
(Figure 14). The changes in occupations across the distribution which occur in response 
to changes in the occupation-specific terms in the multinomial logit model are vastly 
poverty- and inequality-reducing. They contribute a decline of six points in the headcount 
index, actually overshooting the observed decline. Inequality measures move very close 
to the observed 1995 values, and the counterfactual growth incidence curve 
corresponding to these “full trade effects” lies quite close to the observed GIC (1995-
1988). 
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Allowing for changes in the returns to education 
95
ed β  in simulation 4 contributes to a 
further reduction in inequality, as in the wage distribution, and to an under-prediction of 
all, but particularly the highest, incomes (Figure 15). That is partly corrected by allowing 
the other earnings regression coefficients (including the constant) to take their 1995 
values (Figure 16). Finally, replacing the earnings regression residuals with a rank 
preserving transformation of the 1995 residuals leads to column HPCI (6) in Table 9, and 
to the counterfactual GIC in Figure 17.  
 
The underestimates in poverty and inequality implied in this final counterfactual reflect 
two main factors. First, there were substantial changes in labor force participation and 
informality over this period which were unrelated to trade and are thus not captured by 
the simulation. Second, there were also important changes in the incidence of non-labor 
incomes, with a decline in the real value of minimum-wage linked pensions at the bottom 
of the distribution, and an increase in the real value of retirement earnings at the top. Both 
of these trends, which were documented in Ferreira and Barros (1999), help account for 
the difference between the counterfactual and the actual GICs in Figure 17 (and between 
the two bottom lines of Table 9).  
 
These earnings-based simulations are not the most suitable way for understanding 
differences between full household income distributions. The extended version of this 
approach which is described in Bourguignon et al. (2004) would be much more 
appropriate.
37 The point of this subsection, then, was merely to point out that the links 
between trade – and, in particular, trade-mandated employment flows across sectors and 
formality status – and wage inequality do appear to carry through to the changes we have 
observed in the distribution of HPCY in Brazil over this period, including a substantial 
part of the observed poverty reduction. 
 
                                                 
37 Yet another alternative approach would be to decompose (both the actual and counterfactual) changes in 
inequality between 1988 and 1995 into “horizontal” and “vertical” components. The former reflect 
differences in the income changes affecting households at similar initial levels of welfare, while the latter 
captures differences in (conditional mean) changes across different levels in the initial welfare distribution. 
See Ravallion and Lokshin (2004) for a specific decomposition, applied to a (counterfactual) trade reform 
in Morocco.   32
6.   Conclusions 
 
Using a nationally representative sample of workers in all sectors of the economy, this 
paper has sought to quantify the impacts of the 1988-1995 trade liberalization episode on 
the Brazilian wage distribution. Our results confirm previous findings that changes in 
industry wage premia and industry-specific skill premia did not meaningfully contribute 
to changes in the distribution of hourly wages. Trade reforms did contribute to the 
observed reduction in inequality, but this happened through other channels. Chief among 
them were trade-induced changes in employment levels across sectors, industries and 
formality categories (formal, informal, self-employed, employer). The reallocation of 
workers that our model predicts to have arisen from changes in levels of protection, 
exchange rates, import penetration and export shares between 1988 and 1995 accounts 
for more than half of the observed changes in three out of four measures of inequality in 
hourly wages.  
 
The other key channel through which trade reform is likely to have affected the 
distribution of wages is through changes in the economy-wide skill premium. This is the 
channel on which Gonzaga et al. (2006) focused, and they argued that changes in the skill 
premium mandated by a Stolper-Samuelson model of trade would account for more than 
the actual change in skill-premium in manufacturing during 1988-1995. While our 
approach is unable to identify changes in the economy-wide skill premium which are due 
to trade variables from those which are not, our findings are consistent with the Gonzaga 
et al. results: returns to education fell over the period, contributing to a decline in 
inequality which did overshoot the observed decline. If there was any skill-biased 
technical change, or if other forces for greater demand for skill were at work, they were 
more than offset by the joint force of the Stolper-Samuelson effect of trade liberalization 
in an economy that used to protect skill-intensive industries, and of increases in the 
supply of more educated workers. 
 
Overall, even if one does not attribute the decline in the economy-wide returns to 
education to the trade reforms (despite evidence from other sources that part of it is   33
attributable to the Stolper Samuelson effect), our results suggest that trade liberalization 
did play an important part in the reduction of wage inequality in Brazil during 1988-
1995. The counterfactual wage growth incidence curve that includes the combined wage 
and employment effects mandated by changes in trade variables accounted for 59% of the 
observed change in the Theil-L index; 61% of the change in the Gini coefficient; and 
76% of the change in the Theil-T index. Among the combined effects, changes in 
occupation and employment levels across industries were by far the most important. 
These reductions in wage inequality did appear to extend to declines in household income 
inequality, and in the poverty rate.  
 
Some of the implications of these findings are as follows. There is no reason why 
researchers concerned with the distributional effects of trade liberalization should focus 
exclusively on the manufacturing sector; or only on industry-specific wage premia. 
Indeed, it would seem that employment flows and changes in the occupational structure 
of the labor force play a central role, and should be considered explicitly. For policy-
makers, it would seem that in countries where protection was stronger for industries 
intensive in skilled workers (which was not the case in Mexico, Chile or Colombia, but 
was the case in Brazil), there need be no mandatory trade-off between gains in efficiency 
and productivity on the one hand, and increases in inequality or poverty on the other. 
Quite the contrary: the same liberalization efforts that lead to productivity gains may also 
lead to wage gains at the bottom of the distribution, and to reductions in poverty and 
inequality.   34
References 
 
Abreu, Marcelo de Paiva. 2004. “Trade Liberalization and the Political Economy of 
Protection in Brazil since 1987”, INTAL-ITD Working Paper –SITI- 08B, Inter-
American Development Bank. 
Acemoglu, Daron. 2003. “Patterns of Skill Premia”, Review of Economic Studies 70: 199-
230. 
Attanasio, Orazio, Pinelopi Goldberg and Nina Pavcnik. 2004. “Trade Reforms and 
Income Inequality in Colombia”, Journal of Development Economics 74(2): 331-336. 
Beyer, Harold, Patricio Rojas, and Rodrigo Vergara. 1999. “Trade Liberalization and 
Wage Inequality.” Journal of Development Economics 59: 103-123. 
Bourguignon, Francois, Francisco Ferreira and Nora Lustig. 2004. The Microeconomics 
of Income Distribution Dynamics in East Asia and Latin America, Washington DC: 
The World Bank and Oxford University Press. 
Cragg, Michael and Mario Epelbaum. 1996. “Why has Wage Dispersion Grown in 
Mexico?  Is it the incidence of reforms or the growing demand for skills?” Journal of 
Development Economics 51: 99-116. 
Deaton, Angus. 1997. The Analysis of Household Surveys: A Microeconometric 
Approach to Development Policy, Johns Hopkins University Press. 
DiNardo, John, Nicole Fortin and Thomas Lemieux. 1996. “Labor Market Institutions 
and the Distribution of Wages, 1973-1992: A Semiparametric Approach”, 
Econometrica 64(5): 1001-1044. 
Ebrill Liam, Janet Stotsky, and Reint Gropp. 1999. “Revenue Implications of Trade 
Liberalization”, IMF Occasional Paper 180, Washington D.C. 
Edwards, Sebastian. 1998. “Openness, Productivity and Growth: What Do We Really 
Know?”, Economic Journal 108: 383-398. 
Feliciano, Zadia. 2001. “Workers and Trade Liberalization: The Impact of Trade Reforms 
in Mexico on Wages and Employment,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 55 
(1): 95-115. 
Ferreira, Francisco H.G. and Ricardo Paes de Barros. 1999. “The Slippery Slope: 
Explaining the Increase in Extreme Poverty in Urban Brazil, 1976-1996.” Brazilian 
Review of Econometrics 19 (2): 211-296. 
Ferreira, Francisco H.G., Phillippe G. Leite, and Julie A. Litchfield. 2006. “The Rise and 
Fall of Brazilian Inequality: 1981-2004.” World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper #3867.   35
Ferreira, Pedro Cavalcanti and José Luiz Rossi. 2003. “New Evidence from Brazil on 
Trade Liberalization and Productivity Growth”. International Economic Review 44 
(4): 1383-1405. 
Goldberg, Linda. 2004. “Industry-specific Exchange Rates for the United States”, Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, May 2004. 
Goldberg, Pinelopi and Nina Pavcnik. 2004. “Trade, Inequality, and Poverty: What Do 
We Know? Evidence from recent trade liberalization episodes in developing 
countries”, Brookings Trade Forum 2004, Brookings Institute. 
Goldberg, Pinelopi and Nina Pavcnik. 2005. “Trade Protection and Wages: Evidence 
from Colombian Trade Reforms”, Journal of International Economics, May 2005: 
75-105. 
Gonzaga, Gustavo, Naércio Menezes-Filho and Cristina Terra. 2006. “Trade 
Liberalization and the Evolution of Skill Earnings Differentials in Brazil”, Journal of 
International Economics 68(2): 345-367. 
Hanson, Gordon and Ann Harrison. 1999. “Who Gains from Trade Reform? Some 
Remaining Puzzles”, Journal of Development Economics 59(1): 125-154. 
Juhn, Chinhui, Kevin Murphy and Brooks Pierce. 1993. "Wage Inequality and the Rise in 
Returns to Skill," Journal of Political Economy 101 (3): 410-42. 
Kume, Honório, Guida Piani and Carlos Frederico de Souza. 2000. “A política brasileira 
de importação no período 1987-98: descrição e avaliação”. IPEA, Rio de Janeiro, 
unpublished. 
Lemieux, Thomas. 2002. “Decomposing Changes in Wage Distributions: a unified 
approach”. Canadian Journal of Economics 35 (4): 646-688. 
Muendler, Marc-Andreas. 2003. “Series of Market Penetration by Foreign Products, 
Brazil 1986-1998”, University of California, San Diego. 
Nissanke, Machiko and Erik Thorbecke. 2006. “Channels and Policy Debate in the 
Globalization-Inequality-Poverty Nexus”. Cornell University, unpublished. 
Pavcnik, Nina., Andreas Blom, Pinelopi Goldberg, and Norbert Schady. 2004. “Trade 
Policy and Industry Wage Structure: Evidence from Brazil”, World Bank Economic 
Review 18(3): 319-344. 
Ravallion, Martin and Shaohua Chen. 2003. “Measuring Pro-Poor Growth”, Economics 
Letters 78: 93-99. 
Ravallion, Martin and Michael Lokshin. 2004. “Winners and Losers from Trade Reform 
in Morocco”, World Bank, Development Research Group, unpublished.   36
Revenga, Ana. 1997. “Employment and Wage Effects of Trade Liberalization: the Case 
of Mexican Manufacturing”, Journal of Labor Economics 15(3ii): S20-S43. 
Robbins, Donald and T.H. Grindling. 1999. “Trade Liberalization and the Relative 
Wages for More-Skilled Workers in Costa Rica”, Review of Development Economics 
3(2): 140-154. 
Rodriguez, Francisco and Dani Rodrik. 2001. “Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A 
Skeptic’s Guide to the Cross-National Evidence,” in Ben Bernanke and Kenneth S. 
Rogoff, eds., NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, MIT Press for NBER. 
Sachs, Jeffrey. and Andrew Warner. 1995. “Economic reform and the process of global 
integration.”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1-118.  
Shigeoka, Hitoshi, Eric Verhoogen and Matthew Wai-Poi. 2006. “Chinese Competition 
and the Mexican Manufacturing Sector: Plant-Level Evidence and Implications for 
Policy”, Columbia University, unpublished. 
Slaughter, Matthew. 2000. “What are the Results of Product-Prices Studies and What 
Can We Learn from their Differences?” In Feenstra, R. (ed.) The Impact of 
International Trade on Wages, NBER Conference Report, University of Chicago 
Press, pp.129-170. 
Thoenig, Mathias and Thierry Verdier. 2003. “A Theory of Defensive Skill-Biased 
Innovation and Globalization”, American Economic Review 93 (3): 709-728. 
Verhoogen, Eric. 2006. “Trade Quality Upgrading and Wage Inequality in the Mexican 
Manufacturing Sector”, Columbia University, unpublished. 
Winters, Alan, Neil McCulloch and Andrew McKay. 2004. “Trade Liberalization and 
Poverty: the Evidence So Far”, Journal of Economic Literature 62: 72-115. 
Wood, Adrian. (1997) “Openness and Wage Inequality in Developing Countries – the 
Latin American Challenge to East Asian Conventional Wisdom”, World Bank 
Economic Review 11 (1): 33-57. 
 
   37
Table 1: Trade Variables by Industry, 1988 and 1995
Industry 88 95 88 95 88 95 88 95 88 95 88 95
Agricultural products 17 7 15 8 NA NA NA NA 5,347 7,351 110 193
Mining products 20 3 15 0 8 12 98 77 149 196 135 209
Oil and coal extraction 6 0 -3 -2 130 117 0 1 16 24 441 777
Non-metallic minerals 39 10 46 12 1 3 2 4 105 169 180 297
Steel, non-ferrous and other metallurgy prdts. 33 11 37 14 3 7 28 28 92 131 6,021 8,158
Machinery and tractors 47 19 50 18 14 31 18 36 105 172 232 324
Electrical equipment, electronic equipment 50 21 59 30 12 18 7 10 56 86 114 182
Auto., trucks and buses; parts, comp. and other vehicles 43 31 45 74 9 16 13 12 91 147 296 414
Wood products and furniture 30 11 29 12 0 1 4 10 311 540 29 45
Cellulose, paper and printing 32 10 30 10 2 6 6 11 40 55 143 221
Rubber products 49 13 59 15 4 10 6 8 195 299 248 414
Chemical elements and products 66 15 76 16 56 87 33 39 30 46 118 189
Oil refining and petrochemicals 34 4 70 3 12 30 31 7 103 392 96 160
Pharmaceutical and perfumery products 45 8 52 8 6 13 2 3 45 73 208 346
Plastic products 57 15 72 21 2 7 2 3 60 92 311 435
Textile products 57 15 84 22 10 59 27 29 217 334 164 264
Apparel 76 20 94 24 0 3 1 2 162 253 109 185
Footwear 41 18 40 24 3 7 25 36 479 708 18 31
Processing of vegetal products 42 12 86 16 9 15 21 15 112 146 65 111
Meat packing, dairy industry, vegetal and other food products 63 20 73 21 3 7 50 47 52 83 85 140
Unclassified manufacturing 49 14 64 15 0 0 0 0 101 169 102 265
Simple average 44 17 52 21 19 28 22 22 390 566 456 652
Nontradables 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 67 104 91 147
Sources: Nominal tariffs and effective rates of protection from Kume et al. (2000), reported in Abreu (2004); import penetration
and export share of production from Muendler (2003); import- and export-weighted real exchange rates are authors' calculations
from World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2006) and COMTRADE (UN, 2006).  For more details, see Data Appendix.





Table 2: Industry Concordance
Trade Industry (Kume et al) PNAD Code PNAD Industry Final Code Final Industry
Agricultural products 11-42 Various crops, horticulture and forestry 1 Agricultural products
Mining products 50, 53-59 Prospecting and extraction of non-oil/gas/coal minerals 2 Mining products
Oil and coal extraction 51-52 Oil, gas and coal 3 Oil and coal extraction
Non-metallic minerals 100 Non-metal processing 4 Non-metallic minerals
Steel products 110 Steel products 5 Steel, non-ferrous and other metal products
Non-ferrous metallurgy 110 Non-steel metals products 5 Steel, non-ferrous and other metal products
Other metallurgical products 110 5 Steel, non-ferrous and other metal products
Machinery and tractors 120 Manufacture of machines and equipment 6 Machinery and tractors
Electrical equipment 130 Manufacture of electrical and electronic equipment 7 Electrical and electronic equipment
Electronic equipment 130 Manufacture of electrical and electronic equipment 7 Electrical and electronic equipment
Automobiles, trucks and buses 140 Manufacture of vehicles and parts 8 Automobiles, trucks and buses; parts, comp. and other vehicles
Parts, components and other vehicles 140 Manufacture of vehicles and parts 8 Automobiles, trucks and buses; parts, comp. and other vehicles
Wood products and furniture 150, 151, 160 Manufacture of wood products and furniture 9 Wood products and furniture
Cellulose, paper and printing 170, 290 Pulp and paper products, printing and newspapers 10 Cellulose, paper and printing
Rubber products 180 Rubber products 11 Rubber products
Chemical elements 200 Chemical products 12 Chemical elements and products
Oil refining 201 Oil and petroleum products 13 Oil refining and petrochemicals
Chemical products 200 Chemical products 12 Chemical elements and products
Pharmaceutical and perfumery products 210, 220 Pharmaceuticals and toiletries 14 Pharmaceutical and perfumery products
Plastic products 230 Plastics 16 Plastic products
Textile products 240, 241 Textiles 17 Textile products
Apparel 250 Apparel and clothing 18 Apparel
Footwear 251 Footwear 19 Footwear
Coffee industry 21 Meat packing, dairy industry, vegetal and other food products
Processing of vegetal products 280 Tobacco and other vegetal processing 20 Processing of vegetal products
Meat packing 260 Food preparation 21 Meat packing, dairy industry, vegetal and other food products
Dairy industry 260 Food preparation 21 Meat packing, dairy industry, vegetal and other food products
Sugar 17? Sugar cane extraction? 21 Meat packing, dairy industry, vegetal and other food products
Vegetal products 260 21 Meat packing, dairy industry, vegetal and other food products
Other food products 260, 261, 271 Other foods and drinks 21 Meat packing, dairy industry, vegetal and other food products
Other industries 300 Various scientific instruments 99 Unclassified manufacturing
340-903 Construction, services, retail, finance, government etc. 22 Nontradables
Omitted 190 Leather and skins
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Table 3a: First Stage Regression Results: Wages
1987 1988 1989 1990 1992 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Male 0.321 0.32 0.336 0.297 0.249 0.271 0.222 0.214 0.228 0.214 0.216
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)***
Experience 0.048 0.047 0.045 0.044 0.038 0.039 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.034 0.035
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
E x p e r i e n c e  s q u a r e d - 0 . 0 0 1 - 0 . 0 0 1 - 0 . 0 0 1 - 0 . 0 0 1 0000000
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
White 0.135 0.143 0.185 0.157 0.139 0.153 0.156 0.165 0.165 0.159 0.161
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)***
Yellow 0.294 0.318 0.319 0.303 0.264 0.348 0.346 0.398 0.439 0.351 0.285
(0.035)*** (0.038)*** (0.044)*** (0.038)*** (0.042)*** (0.040)*** (0.040)*** (0.043)*** (0.046)*** (0.035)*** (0.040)***
1-3 years education 0.213 0.19 0.203 0.195 0.143 0.172 0.145 0.146 0.14 0.144 0.124
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***
4 years education 0.393 0.4 0.398 0.392 0.324 0.356 0.307 0.304 0.288 0.281 0.266
(0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)***
5-7 years education 0.578 0.582 0.573 0.561 0.463 0.496 0.436 0.406 0.41 0.398 0.373
(0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)***
Completed primary 0.815 0.812 0.806 0.767 0.666 0.709 0.628 0.605 0.602 0.586 0.547
(0.012)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.012)*** (0.011)*** (0.012)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)***
9-10 years education 0.955 0.967 0.981 0.944 0.82 0.848 0.746 0.741 0.726 0.705 0.664
(0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.015)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)***
Completed high school 1.23 1.274 1.224 1.096 0.933 1.047 0.968 1.002 1.001 0.938 0.896
(0.058)*** (0.060)*** (0.061)*** (0.049)*** (0.047)*** (0.049)*** (0.047)*** (0.047)*** (0.047)*** (0.046)*** (0.041)***
12-14 years education 1.623 1.691 1.656 1.511 1.283 1.426 1.39 1.439 1.404 1.35 1.307
(0.060)*** (0.062)*** (0.063)*** (0.051)*** (0.049)*** (0.052)*** (0.049)*** (0.049)*** (0.049)*** (0.048)*** (0.043)***
Completed university 2.05 2.147 2.05 1.915 1.649 1.82 1.791 1.824 1.814 1.761 1.738
(0.059)*** (0.061)*** (0.062)*** (0.050)*** (0.049)*** (0.051)*** (0.048)*** (0.049)*** (0.048)*** (0.047)*** (0.042)***
Formal employee 0.22 0.333 0.237 0.17 0.401 0.357 0.184 0.182 0.198 0.207 0.228
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
Self-employed 0.274 0.295 0.338 0.319 0.302 0.337 0.257 0.268 0.205 0.184 0.197
(0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)***
Employer 0.966 0.974 1.07 0.938 0.925 0.972 0.938 0.903 0.908 0.853 0.876
(0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.017)*** (0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.014)*** (0.016)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)***
Northeast region -0.369 -0.353 -0.441 -0.443 -0.291 -0.404 -0.29 -0.276 -0.296 -0.228 -0.244
(0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)***
Southeast region -0.077 -0.025 -0.092 -0.124 0.097 -0.021 0.072 0.105 0.1 0.13 0.112
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)***
South region -0.146 -0.107 -0.16 -0.165 0.063 0.026 -0.003 0.013 0.034 0.055 0.02
(0.010)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)** -0.01 -0.011 (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)**
Central West region -0.019 -0.005 -0.079 -0.045 0.055 0.068 0.014 0.055 0.047 0.064 0.042
(0.010)* -0.01 (0.011)*** (0.010)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** -0.01 (0.011)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)***
Metropolitan residence 0.319 0.331 0.328 0.313 0.302 0.307 0.321 0.326 0.317 0.295 0.252
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***
Urban residence 0.198 0.127 0.146 0.158 0.135 0.145 0.157 0.15 0.122 0.108 0.091
(0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)***
Head of household 0.208 0.203 0.193 0.189 0.159 0.166 0.175 0.17 0.156 0.156 0.149
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
Industry indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry*Skill indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 112,655 112,730 114,961 116,882 118,075 119,949 128,360 124,017 131,202 129,719 133,310
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 5 90 . 5 90 . 5 70 . 5 80 . 5 50 . 5 50 . 5 60 . 5 40 . 5 60 . 5 60 . 5 6
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent variable is real hourly wages from principal job.
Regions are relative to North region.  White and yellow are relative to Black.  Educational attainment indicators are relative to no education.
Informal employee and self-employed coefficients are relative to formal employees.Table 3b: First Stage Regression Results: Industry Wage Premiums
Industry 1987 1988 1989 1990 1992 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Mining products 0.514 0.578 0.488 0.433 0.238 0.315 0.316 0.213 0.347 0.393 0.349
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Oil and coal extraction 0.678 0.666 0.680 0.727 0.835 0.874 0.817 1.043 0.677 0.824 0.994
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.012) (0.018) (0.019) (0.013) (0.018)
Non-metallic minerals 0.202 0.203 0.225 0.242 0.188 0.191 0.274 0.269 0.353 0.353 0.314
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Steel, non-ferrous and other metallurgy prdts. 0.398 0.398 0.373 0.458 0.381 0.378 0.476 0.484 0.494 0.492 0.432
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Machinery and tractors 0.538 0.539 0.520 0.636 0.406 0.473 0.516 0.508 0.562 0.504 0.495
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Electrical equipment, electronic equipment 0.467 0.493 0.450 0.614 0.507 0.404 0.551 0.503 0.611 0.577 0.458
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Auto., trucks and buses; parts, comp. and other vehicles 0.509 0.608 0.529 0.680 0.646 0.590 0.685 0.692 0.662 0.657 0.628
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Wood products and furniture 0.035 0.020 0.041 0.157 0.091 0.131 0.274 0.299 0.290 0.303 0.298
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cellulose, paper and printing 0.325 0.382 0.328 0.437 0.410 0.343 0.484 0.456 0.512 0.490 0.466
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Rubber products 0.480 0.536 0.325 0.515 0.293 0.387 0.553 0.665 0.433 0.394 0.473
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Chemical elements and products 0.410 0.326 0.300 0.394 0.383 0.288 0.421 0.421 0.458 0.403 0.454
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Oil refining and petrochemicals 0.563 0.709 0.600 0.571 0.696 0.677 0.532 0.508 0.566 0.511 0.554
(0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011)
Pharmaceutical and perfumery products 0.343 0.418 0.294 0.396 0.431 0.445 0.434 0.485 0.565 0.533 0.521
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Plastic products 0.360 0.364 0.382 0.465 0.315 0.317 0.423 0.375 0.425 0.435 0.374
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Textile products 0.153 0.239 0.207 0.253 0.195 0.223 0.321 0.285 0.386 0.338 0.184
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Apparel 0.267 0.310 0.334 0.482 0.267 0.259 0.331 0.317 0.380 0.342 0.310
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Footwear 0.210 0.121 0.278 0.412 0.253 0.176 0.249 0.268 0.271 0.209 0.237
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Processing of vegetal products 0.306 0.360 0.192 0.276 0.522 0.408 0.640 0.477 0.426 0.446 0.174
(0.013) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.014) (0.006)
Meat packing, dairy industry, vegetal and other food products 0.151 0.169 0.166 0.270 0.180 0.225 0.298 0.316 0.328 0.331 0.277
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unclassified manufacturing 0.068 0.065 0.100 0.160 0.080 0.071 0.095 0.196 0.159 0.147 0.103
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Nontradables 0.164 0.149 0.149 0.300 0.184 0.171 0.306 0.328 0.371 0.367 0.327
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard errors are in brackets.Table 3c: First Stage Regression Results: Industry Skill Premiums
Industry 1987 1988 1989 1990 1992 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Mining products 0.089 0.108 0.267 0.400 0.462 -0.052 0.163 0.258 0.180 0.326 0.220
(0.018) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
Oil and coal extraction 0.465 0.411 0.537 0.495 0.293 0.202 0.151 0.039 0.380 0.143 0.081
(0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.029) (0.023) (0.030) (0.022) (0.031) (0.032) (0.028) (0.025)
Non-metallic minerals 0.123 0.184 0.162 0.090 0.144 0.130 0.225 0.184 0.059 0.044 0.107
(0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Steel, non-ferrous and other metallurgy prdts. 0.030 -0.071 0.096 0.125 0.148 0.132 0.090 -0.020 0.000 0.037 0.051
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Machinery and tractors -0.080 -0.119 -0.121 0.020 0.218 0.082 0.050 -0.008 -0.014 0.036 0.001
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Electrical equipment, electronic equipment 0.082 0.073 0.069 0.113 0.039 0.104 0.093 -0.035 -0.052 0.031 0.096
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Auto., trucks and buses; parts, comp. and other vehicles -0.007 -0.018 -0.072 -0.014 0.113 0.253 0.020 -0.104 -0.010 0.056 0.001
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Wood products and furniture -0.051 0.036 -0.125 0.121 0.050 0.020 -0.008 -0.179 -0.218 -0.059 -0.143
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
Cellulose, paper and printing -0.046 -0.131 0.000 0.046 0.006 -0.079 0.032 -0.069 -0.067 0.005 -0.067
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Rubber products -0.025 -0.273 0.054 -0.136 0.109 0.337 0.158 -0.018 0.179 0.258 -0.197
(0.032) (0.029) (0.022) (0.026) (0.025) (0.015) (0.017) (0.021) (0.024) (0.015) (0.021)
Chemical elements and products 0.155 0.175 0.223 0.282 0.254 0.327 0.225 0.173 0.139 0.156 0.073
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005)
Oil refining and petrochemicals 0.456 0.216 0.074 0.374 0.287 0.201 0.294 0.215 0.380 0.308 0.250
(0.019) (0.015) (0.026) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018)
Pharmaceutical and perfumery products 0.088 -0.057 0.184 0.211 0.193 0.078 0.243 0.152 -0.052 0.111 0.066
(0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007)
Plastic products 0.050 0.110 -0.080 0.170 0.125 -0.084 0.133 0.074 0.055 -0.030 0.043
(0.018) (0.014) (0.022) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006)
Textile products -0.002 0.153 0.086 0.117 0.235 0.145 0.181 0.143 -0.099 0.002 0.123
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006)
Apparel -0.185 -0.288 -0.224 -0.116 -0.160 -0.242 -0.230 -0.289 -0.119 -0.194 -0.135
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
Footwear -0.058 -0.062 -0.024 0.061 -0.105 -0.113 -0.155 -0.084 -0.157 -0.054 -0.153
(0.019) (0.015) (0.018) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006)
Processing of vegetal products 0.126 0.024 -0.069 0.329 0.242 0.001 -0.280 0.117 0.229 0.257 0.332
(0.025) (0.041) (0.024) (0.031) (0.023) (0.022) (0.047) (0.022) (0.032) (0.032) (0.017)
Meat packing, dairy industry, vegetal and other food products 0.000 -0.009 0.019 0.010 0.125 -0.003 0.069 -0.064 -0.006 0.016 0.032
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Unclassified manufacturing 0.110 0.056 0.282 0.357 0.233 0.035 0.232 0.081 0.140 0.137 0.167
(0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Nontradables 0.194 0.141 0.185 0.265 0.204 0.158 0.130 0.055 0.053 0.095 0.101
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Standard errors are in brackets. 
Table 4a: First Stage Regression Results, 1988 and 1995: Employment multinomial logit - Marginal Effects
Probability (at mean) 0.329 0.026 0.186 0.046 0.013 0.016 0.080 0.108 0.173 0.022
Male 0.009 *** 0.137 *** 0.091 *** 0.025 *** 0.017 *** 0.081 *** -0.010 *** 0.087 *** 0.032 ***
Experience 0.001 *** 0.005 *** -0.001 *** 0.000 *** -0.001 *** 0.008 *** -0.010 *** 0.015 *** 0.005 ***
Experience squared 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
White -0.008 *** 0.013 *** -0.015 *** -0.002 *** -0.001 0.005 *** -0.031 *** -0.026 *** 0.015 ***
Yellow -0.030 *** 0.093 * 0.042 ** -0.032 *** 0.003 0.006 -0.098 *** -0.076 *** 0.022 ***
1-3 years education 0.007 *** -0.013 -0.030 *** -0.004 *** -0.001 0.020 *** 0.007 *** 0.032 *** 0.013 ***
4 years education 0.005 *** -0.010 *** -0.056 *** -0.008 *** -0.002 0.039 *** -0.003 *** 0.065 *** 0.024 ***
5-7 years education 0.013 *** -0.048 *** -0.088 *** -0.014 *** -0.003 0.048 *** 0.003 *** 0.088 *** 0.029 ***
Completed primary 0.012 *** -0.044 ** -0.120 *** -0.018 *** -0.006 ** 0.051 *** -0.005 0.130 *** 0.040 ***
9-10 years education 0.009 *** -0.071 *** -0.130 *** -0.026 *** -0.009 *** 0.042 *** -0.011 0.165 *** 0.042 ***
Completed high school 0.018 *** -0.074 -0.131 *** -0.017 *** -0.011 ** 0.055 *** 0.033 *** 0.222 *** 0.052 ***
12-14 years education 0.001 -0.122 *** -0.188 *** -0.033 *** -0.013 *** 0.046 *** 0.078 *** 0.229 *** 0.054 ***
Completed university 0.009 *** -0.039 *** -0.132 *** -0.017 * -0.012 0.053 *** 0.117 *** 0.238 *** 0.058 ***
Region 2 0.008 *** -0.013 0.027 *** 0.014 *** 0.000 -0.014 ** -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
Region 3 0.005 *** -0.085 *** 0.036 *** 0.030 *** -0.005 0.064 *** -0.002 *** 0.024 *** 0.001 ***
Region 4 0.009 *** -0.021 *** 0.011 *** 0.023 *** -0.007 0.059 *** -0.021 *** 0.054 *** -0.001 ***
Region 5 0.000 -0.052 *** 0.038 *** 0.021 *** 0.001 -0.048 *** 0.021 *** 0.044 *** 0.003 ***
Metropolitan residence 0.033 *** -0.203 *** -0.163 *** -0.041 *** 0.006 *** 0.099 *** 0.073 *** 0.191 *** -0.013 ***
Urban residence 0.026 *** -0.198 *** -0.069 *** -0.019 *** 0.004 *** 0.066 *** 0.082 *** 0.140 *** -0.007 ***
Head of household 0.004 *** 0.095 *** 0.014 *** 0.014 *** 0.007 *** 0.082 *** 0.065 *** 0.145 *** 0.030 ***
Children 0-14 years in household -0.003 *** -0.011 *** -0.001 *** 0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.014 *** -0.005 *** -0.042 *** -0.002 ***
Has a spouse who works -0.972 *** 1.870 *** 0.439 *** 0.124 0.159 *** 0.753 *** 1.033 *** 1.660 *** 0.218 ***
Observations
Probability (at mean) 0.308 0.046 0.203 0.034 0.013 0.015 0.061 0.103 0.190 0.027
Male -0.004 *** 0.160 *** 0.073 *** 0.026 *** 0.015 *** 0.061 *** -0.040 *** 0.050 *** 0.036 ***
Experience 0.001 *** 0.008 *** 0.000 *** 0.001 *** -0.001 *** 0.007 *** -0.005 *** 0.021 *** 0.006 ***
Experience squared 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
White -0.008 *** 0.023 -0.013 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** 0.003 ** -0.022 *** -0.028 *** 0.014 ***
Yellow -0.029 *** 0.114 *** 0.016 -0.006 -0.008 -0.017 ** -0.041 *** -0.133 *** 0.039 ***
1-3 years education -0.001 *** 0.004 *** -0.022 *** -0.005 *** -0.002 0.019 *** -0.004 *** 0.052 *** 0.010 ***
4 years education -0.003 *** 0.001 *** -0.039 *** -0.009 *** -0.001 *** 0.034 *** -0.017 *** 0.092 *** 0.025 ***
5-7 years education 0.006 *** -0.016 *** -0.062 *** -0.013 *** 0.000 *** 0.043 *** -0.021 0.115 *** 0.029 ***
Completed primary 0.008 *** -0.017 *** -0.080 *** -0.026 *** -0.003 0.047 *** -0.049 *** 0.171 *** 0.038 ***
9-10 years education 0.008 *** -0.042 * -0.095 *** -0.031 *** -0.007 0.046 *** -0.045 *** 0.206 *** 0.049 ***
Completed high school 0.006 *** -0.028 *** -0.103 *** -0.028 *** -0.007 0.054 *** -0.053 *** 0.293 *** 0.059 ***
12-14 years education -0.003 *** -0.048 *** -0.150 *** -0.036 *** -0.010 0.048 *** -0.045 0.321 *** 0.068 ***
Completed university -0.009 *** -0.016 *** -0.096 *** -0.027 *** -0.010 0.059 *** -0.049 *** 0.358 *** 0.075 ***
Region 2 -0.011 0.016 *** 0.008 *** 0.018 *** -0.005 *** -0.007 0.006 *** 0.000 ** -0.002
Region 3 -0.012 *** -0.081 *** 0.023 *** 0.035 *** -0.004 0.054 *** 0.002 *** 0.042 *** -0.001 ***
Region 4 -0.007 *** -0.036 *** 0.014 *** 0.031 *** -0.004 0.062 *** -0.003 *** 0.043 *** 0.004 ***
Region 5 -0.006 *** -0.071 *** 0.029 *** 0.028 *** -0.004 *** -0.021 *** 0.020 *** 0.029 *** 0.003 *
Metropolitan residence 0.054 *** -0.216 *** -0.108 *** -0.049 *** 0.003 0.048 *** 0.074 *** 0.186 *** -0.016 ***
Urban residence 0.045 *** -0.216 *** -0.047 *** -0.019 *** 0.002 *** 0.033 *** 0.077 *** 0.139 *** -0.011 ***
Head of household 0.011 *** 0.013 *** 0.007 *** 0.012 *** 0.003 *** 0.046 *** 0.040 *** 0.104 *** 0.022 ***
Children 0-14 years in household 0.005 *** -0.024 *** 0.000 *** 0.001 * -0.001 *** -0.003 *** -0.007 *** -0.028 *** -0.005 ***
Has a spouse who works -0.055 *** 0.156 *** 0.013 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.019 *** 0.021 *** 0.077 *** 0.021 ***
Observations
Marginal effects reported.  White and yellow are race indicators (black is omitted category); 0 years of education is omitted education category.
Columns headed 0-9 indicate ML results for each employment classification: 0. Not economically active; 1. Unemployed; 2. Self-employed (all industries); 3. Informal agriculture; 4. Formal agricu
 5. Informal manufacturing; 6. Formal manufacturing; 7. Informal nontradable sector; 8. Formal nontradable sector; 9. Employer (all industries).
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1234 0 6789Table 4b: First Stage Regression Results, 1988 and 1995: Employment multinomial logit - industry participation constant
Industry 1987 1988 1989 1990 1992 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Unemployed -4.428 -3.787 -4.476 -4.234 -2.984 -2.783 -2.978 -3.106 -2.802 -2.659 -2.572
(0.134)*** (0.124)*** (0.142)*** (0.130)*** (0.092)*** (0.092)*** (0.091)*** (0.087)*** (0.080)*** (0.077)*** (0.072)***
Self-employed -1.157 -1.177 -1.052 -1.168 -1.427 -1.523 -1.75 -2.158 -2.106 -2.135 -2.054
(0.060)*** (0.060)*** (0.060)*** (0.059)*** (0.057)*** (0.057)*** (0.055)*** (0.055)*** (0.054)*** (0.054)*** (0.053)***
Informal agr. -1.374 -1.973 -1.39 -1.483 -2.161 -2.253 -2.648 -3.175 -2.949 -2.631 -2.73
(0.117)*** (0.128)*** (0.125)*** (0.120)*** (0.128)*** (0.125)*** (0.129)*** (0.135)*** (0.128)*** (0.129)*** (0.129)***
Formal agr. -4.487 -5.104 -4.55 -4.358 -5.934 -6.382 -5.984 -6.483 -7.11 -6.019 -6.919
(0.240)*** (0.276)*** (0.284)*** (0.236)*** (0.311)*** (0.314)*** (0.291)*** (0.310)*** (0.417)*** (0.294)*** (0.388)***
Informal manuf. -3.161 -3.059 -3.054 -2.944 -3.73 -3.433 -3.614 -4.07 -4.038 -4.096 -4.408
(0.141)*** (0.140)*** (0.133)*** (0.139)*** (0.145)*** (0.135)*** (0.138)*** (0.141)*** (0.133)*** (0.140)*** (0.141)***
Formal manuf. -4.395 -4.462 -4.116 -4.136 -5.138 -5.153 -5.394 -5.524 -5.273 -5.474 -5.302
(0.091)*** (0.092)*** (0.090)*** (0.091)*** (0.101)*** (0.101)*** (0.102)*** (0.101)*** (0.097)*** (0.102)*** (0.103)***
Informal nontrad. -1.369 -1.578 -1.456 -1.44 -1.324 -1.206 -1.558 -1.753 -1.744 -1.636 -1.791
(0.064)*** (0.065)*** (0.065)*** (0.063)*** (0.066)*** (0.062)*** (0.062)*** (0.060)*** (0.059)*** (0.058)*** (0.058)***
Formal nontrad. -3.123 -2.967 -2.841 -2.919 -3.62 -3.575 -3.802 -3.727 -3.797 -3.802 -3.814
(0.064)*** (0.063)*** (0.063)*** (0.063)*** (0.062)*** (0.062)*** (0.061)*** (0.058)*** (0.058)*** (0.059)*** (0.058)***
Employer -7.571 -8.099 -6.581 -6.615 -7.724 -8.007 -7.83 -8.185 -8.477 -8.365 -8.205
(0.149)*** (0.156)*** (0.128)*** (0.122)*** (0.139)*** (0.145)*** (0.136)*** (0.144)*** (0.137)*** (0.138)*** (0.135)***
Observations 177,399 177,376 179,938 184,724 193,931 197,658 208,400 209,264 219,710 221,088 227,369
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Non-economically active is omitted category.  
 
 
Table 5: Industry Wage Premiums and Trade Exposure
Dependent variable is industry wage premium (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ERP 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
ERP * lagged import penetration -0.0001 -0.0005
(0.0019) (0.0019)
Lagged ERP 0.0003 0.0003 0.0005 0.0003 0.0005
(0.0001)* (0.0001)** (0.0002)*** (0.0001)** (0.0002)***
Lagged ERP * lagged import penetration -0.0015 -0.0015
(0.0011) (0.0012)
Lagged import penetration -0.1531 0.0992 -0.1196 -0.0926 0.1245 0.1508
(0.1533) (0.1757) (0.1452) (0.1505) (0.1645) (0.1746)
Lagged export share -0.0524 -0.1251 -0.0284 -0.0282 -0.1008 -0.1008
(0.1313) (0.1354) (0.1298) (0.1306) (0.1334) (0.1341)
Lagged imp. pen * lagged imp.weighted RER -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.0004)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0004)***
Lagged exp.shr * lagged exp.weighted RER 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
Observations 210 207 207 210 207 207 207 207
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 0 10 . 0 10 . 0 30 . 0 10 . 0 20 . 0 20 . 0 30 . 0 4
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 6: Industry Skill Premiums and Trade Exposure
Dependent variable is industry skill premium (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ERP -0.0004 0 0
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007)
ERP * lagged import penetration -0.0031 -0.0027
(0.0028) (0.0027)
Lagged ERP -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Lagged ERP * lagged import penetration -0.0001 0.0002
(0.0012) (0.0014)
Lagged import penetration -0.2762 -0.486 -0.3476 -0.3453 -0.3578 -0.361
(0.1652)* (0.1855)*** (0.1509)** (0.1551)** (0.1886)* (0.1928)*
Lagged export share 0.0746 0.1151 0.0445 0.0446 0.0826 0.0826
(0.1493) (0.1577) (0.1510) (0.1514) (0.1591) (0.1595)
Lagged imp. pen * lagged imp.weighted RER 0.001 0.0012 0.0012
(0.0005)* (0.0005)** (0.0005)**
Lagged exp.shr * lagged exp.weighted RER 0 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Observations 204 201 201 208 201 201 204 204
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
Table 7: Industry Participation and Trade Exposure
Dependent variable is industry participation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ERP 0.0087 -0.0025 -0.0043
(0.0076) (0.0213) (0.0229)
ERP * lagged import penetration 0.0849 0.0965
(0.1407) (0.1574)
Lagged ERP -0.0148 -0.0139 -0.015 -0.015 -0.0161
(0.0041)*** (0.0045)*** (0.0047)*** (0.0069)** (0.0077)**
Lagged ERP * lagged import penetration 0.0437 0.0483
(0.0326) (0.0723)
Lagged import penetration -1.5541 -0.2417 (1.3357) (1.2278) 0.4760 1.2010
(3.9782) (5.7256) (1.4342) (1.5567) (3.8118) (4.6518)
Lagged export share 5.9193 4.9226 3.328 4.0074 2.5479 2.9954
(2.0965)*** (3.4338) (1.1175)*** (1.0568)*** (2.3503) (2.3160)
Lagged imp. pen * lagged imp.weighted RER -0.0091 -0.0049 -0.0024
(0.0152) (0.0105) (0.0080)
Lagged exp.shr * lagged exp.weighted RER 0.0053 -0.0014 0.005
(0.0183) (0.0152) (0.0223)
Observations 80 72 36 72 72 72 36 36
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.12
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  




Table 8: Actual and Counterfactual Hourly Wage Distributions 
  P90/P10 GE(0)  GE(1)  Gini 
( ) ( ) 88
1
88
88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 ) * ( * exp i j ij ij j ij ij ij F sp S I wp I X w θ β
− + + + =   16.9 0.703 0.780 0.611
( ) ( ) 88
1
88
88 88 88 88 88 88 1 ) * ( * exp i j ij ij
s
j ij ij ij F sp S I wp I X w θ β
− + + + =   16.9 0.705 0.784 0.611
( ) ( ) 88
1
88




j ij ij ij F sp S I wp I X w θ β
− + + + =   16.7 0.699 0.774 0.609
( ) ( ) 88
1
88








ij ij ij F sp S I wp I X w θ β
− + + + =   14.6 0.653 0.731 0.593
( ) ( ) 88
1
88






ij ij F sp S I wp I X w θ β
− + + + =   12.9 0.600 0.669 0.572
( ) ( ) 88
1
88




ij ij ij F sp S I wp I X w θ β
− + + + =   12.3 0.581 0.657 0.566
( ) ( ) 88
1
95




ij ij ij F sp S I wp I X w θ β
− + + + =   12.0 0.587 0.691 0.571
( ) ( ) 95
1
95
95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 ) * ( * exp i j ij ij j ij ij ij F sp S I wp I X w θ β
− + + + =   12.4 0.617 0.715 0.582




Table 9: Actual and Counterfactual Household Per Capita Income 
Distributions 
Poverty Line R$87.55    P90/P10 GE(0)  GE(1)  Gini 
FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2) 
88
ij HPCI   19.3  0.717 0.750 0.609 27.7  11.5  6.7 
1
ij HPCI   19.9  0.729 0.760 0.613 27.7  12.1  7.1 
2
ij HPCI   19.7  0.724 0.755 0.611 27.8  12.1  7.1 
3
ij HPCI   16.9  0.658 0.692 0.589 21.2  8.7  4.9 
4
ij HPCI   15.3  0.613 0.644 0.571 21.2  8.6  4.9 
5
ij HPCI   15.4  0.616 0.645 0.572 19.0  7.6  4.3 
6
ij HPCI   15.2  0.621 0.663 0.575 19.7  7.8  4.4 
95
ij HPCI   16.9  0.660 0.706 0.592 23.8  10.5  6.3 
Note: This is a relative poverty line, calculated to represent 50% of the 
median household per capita income in 1988 (expressed in 2004 prices.  
Source: Authors’ calculations from the PNAD. 
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effective rate of protection nominal tariffs import penetration
 
 
Source: Tariffs and rates of protection from Kume et al. (2000) presented in Abreu (2004).  Import penetration from Muendler (2003). 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. Rates of protection from Kume et al. (2000) presented in Abreu (2004); import penetration from 
Muendler (2003); employment from PNADs. 
 







































































































Share Ratio Source: Authors' calculation from PNADs.





Figure 5: Change in Employment versus Change in 
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Figure 6: Observed and counterfactual wage growth incidence curves, 
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Figure 7: Observed and counterfactual wage growth incidence curves, 









0 1 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0 1 0 0
percentiles
%
g (p) g 1(p) g 2(p) Source: Authors' calculation from PNADs.  
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Figure 8: Observed and counterfactual wage growth incidence curves, 
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Figure 9: Observed and counterfactual wage growth incidence curves, 
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g (p) g 3(p) g 4(p) Source: Authors' calculation from PNADs.  
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Figure 10: Observed and counterfactual wage growth incidence curves, 
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Figure 11: Observed and counterfactual wage growth incidence curves, 
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Figure 12: Observed and counterfactual household per capita income growth 
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Figure 13: Observed and counterfactual household per capita income growth 
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g (p) g 1(p) g 2(p) Source: Authors' calculation from PNADs.  
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Figure 14: Observed and counterfactual household per capita income growth 
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Figure 15: Observed and counterfactual household per capita income growth 
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Figure 16: Observed and counterfactual household per capita income growth 









0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
percentiles
%
g (p) g 4(p) g 5(p) Source: Authors' calculation from PNADs.  
 
Figure 17: Observed and counterfactual household per capita income growth 
incidence curves, 1995-1988: trade effects, price changes 
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Data Appendix 
 
This data appendix outlines how each trade variable used in our second-stage regressions 
was constructed. The main trade variables are industry-specific real exchange rates; 
effective rates of protection; import penetration rates and export shares of production. 
 
Industry-specific trade-weighted real exchange rates 
Adapting Goldberg (2004), we construct both export- and import-weighted real exchange 







































t rer are the bilateral real exchange rates with each Brazilian trading partner c. 
Rather than deriving real exchange rates for every trading partner by industry and year, a 
large undertaking, we have ranked countries by decreasing size of imports (exports) in 
each industry, and included those countries who (i) make up the first 95% of imports 
(exports), and (ii) whose imports (exports) are over 1% of the total within that industry.  
To reduce spurious volatility in the exchange rate series due to a changing composition of 
the set of countries in the annual weights, we depart from Goldberg by defining our 



















































These weights are based on a country’s share of trade over the period 1985-1999.  All 
trading partners of significance over the period are included, and their real exchange rates   55
are weighted identically in each year, so the variation in the aggregate industry exchange 
rate comes from changes in trading partners’ exchange rates, rather than trade volume or 
inclusion/exclusion in different years. 
 
We use trade data from COMTRADE at the SITC 4-digit level.  A concordance was 
constructed to match each SITC2 4-digit industry code to the more aggregated industries 
of the ERP data from Kume et al.  Imports (exports) are then summed by country over 
these ERP industries to give us 
jc
t M  (
jc
t X ). Bilateral real exchange rates were 
constructed by multiplying each country’s nominal exchange rate (in local currency per 
Real) by the ratio of the Brazilian price index to the partner country price index, where 
the WPI (wholesale price index) was used where available, and the CPI (consumer price 
index) otherwise.  Countries for which neither a full time series of WPI or CPI were 
available were excluded. For the nontradables sector, we constructed economy-wide real 
exchange rates, using imports and exports with trading partners across all industries to 
derive country weights. 
 
Effective rates of protection 
ERPs from 1985-1999 are available from Kume et al. (2000).  We have used them as 
reported in Abreu (2004). However, the industry classifications differ from those 
available in the PNAD. Adapting the concordance used by Pavcnik et al. (2004), we 
averaged ERPs across certain ERP industries using lagged industry imports as weights. 
The summary final concordance is reported in Table 2 in the main text. 
 
Import penetration rate and export share of production 
Both of these variables were constructed in the same way; the raw data for both is from 
Muendler (2003), and available at http://www.econ.ucsd.edu/muendler/html/brazil.html.  
These data are given by Nível 80 (an official Brazilian classification), a different industry 
classification than that afforded us by the PNAD, so a concordance from Nível 80 to 
Nível 100 (also available on Muendler’s website) was used to move to Nível 100, and a 
second concordance from Nível 100 to the ERP industry categories was constructed by 
the authors to standardize industries. As with ERPs, import weights were then used to   56
average certain industry import penetration and export share to arrive at data series for 
the final industries used in the paper. 
 
Concordances 
There are a number of concordances used to standardize industries across the various 
trade data.  The final industry classifications were driven by those available in the PNAD.  
The concordances used were: 
1.  ERP industry (i.e. the industry classification used by Kume et al., which is similar 
to Nivel 50) to our final industry classification (author constructed). 
2.  ERP to PNAD (author constructed, based on Pavcnik et al. (2004)). 
3.  Nivel 80 to Nivel 100 (available from Muendler). 
4.  Nivel 100 to ERP (author constructed). 
5.  SITC2 to ERP (author constructed). 
The steps taken to standardize each trade variable’s industry classifications are listed in 
the table below. 
 
Table A1: Industry Standardization: Steps and Concordances
Trade Variable Initial Industry Classification Concordance Steps Concordances Used
Trade-weighted RER SITC2 SITC2 to ERP SITC2-ERP (authors)
ERP to Final (PNAD) ERP-PNAD (authors)
ERP Unknown (referred to here as ERP) ERP to Final (PNAD) ERP-PNAD (authors)
Import penetration Nivel 80 Niv 80 to Niv 100 Niv80-Niv100 (Muendler)
Niv 100 to ERP Niv100-ERP (authors)
ERP to Final (PNAD) ERP-PNAD (authors)
Export share Nivel 80 Niv 80 to Niv 100 Niv80-Niv100 (Muendler)
Niv 100 to ERP Niv100-ERP (authors)
ERP to Final (PNAD) ERP-PNAD (authors)  